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Abstract
When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions
arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms
do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction
aﬀects network formation, while the second coordination friction aﬀects network
clearing. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not
independent. The wage mechanism determines both the distribution of networks
that can arise and the number of matches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit
wage dispersion are ineﬃcient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall
(firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms
that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a
realized network.
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1 Introduction
When workers apply to one or more jobs, a network arises where each application estab-
lishes a link between a worker and a firm. In such a decentralized environment there are
two coordination frictions, (i) workers do not know where other workers apply to and (ii)
firms do not know which workers are considered by other firms. We can think of the first
coordination friction as referring to random network formation, while the second coor-
dination friction aﬀects network clearing (the number of matches on a given network).
Treating the search process as a matching on a bipartite network gives new insights into
one of the key questions in the labor-search literature namely, under which conditions
is the decentralized market outcome constraint eﬃcient? With constraint eﬃciency we
mean that the market outcome is identical to the outcome of a hypothetical social planner
who maximizes social welfare given the fundamental frictions. The main contribution of
our paper is that it shows how under directed search (workers observe the wage before
applying to a job), the wage mechanism aﬀects frictions through network formation and
clearing.1
We find that eﬃcient network formation requires that all vacancies should receive an
application with the same probability and that eﬃcient network clearing requires ex post
Bertrand competition between firms that consider the same candidate. Random search,
where each vacancy has the same contact probability and directed search without ex-ante
wage dispersion, lead to eﬃcient random network formation. The eﬃciency condition
in Kircher (2009), where workers send multiple applications and firms can contact all
workers, dictates however that some vacancies should have a higher probability to receive
an application than others. The diﬀerence between our eﬃciency condition and Kircher’s
occurs because he places more restrictions on the planner’s network clearing mechanism.
Wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition are socially eﬃcient
in terms of network clearing, because they generate the maximum number of matches
1Coles and Eeckhout (2003) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) show that the number of matches
in a model with identical workers is independent of the posted wage mechanism. We show that this
does not occurs if workers send multiple applications. In the random search models of Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000) the wage determination process and the matching process are
fully independent. In Moen’s (2000) competitive search model, workers can sort in sub markets which
are characterized by diﬀerent wage and market tightness pairs. Within each sub market, given market
tightness, the number of matches does not depend on wages. When workers apply to only one job, only
the first coordination friction occurs, since all firms that receive at least one application can be sure that
their selected candidate has no competing oﬀer from another firm, see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
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possible. This happens because firms can increase their wages in subgraphs with an
excess number of vacancies. Firms in subgraphs with an excess number of workers do not
have to increase their posted wages. Ex post Bertrand competition therefore solves the
second (between-firm-coordination) friction.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to analyze how decentralized wage
mechanisms aﬀect network clearing in a decentralized search model with complete recall
where workers only know where they send their own applications and firms only know
which workers applied to them. Part of the network literature has analyzed diﬀerent
pricing mechanisms and has studied whether these price mechanisms lead to an eﬃcient
matching of sellers and buyers. Kranton and Minehart (2001) show for example that a
public ascending price auction ensures eﬃcient network clearing. Corominas-Bosch (2004)
shows for identical sellers and buyers that an alternating oﬀers game where all sellers (or
buyers) of a subgraph simultaneously announce prices leads to a maximum matching.
This literature, however, assumes that once a network has been formed all agents know
the complete network (or the entire subgraph of the network they are in).2 This knowledge
allows sellers and buyers to determine their outside option trading partners and trading
prices. We show that ex post Bertrand competition achieves the maximummatching, even
if agents do not know the network structure. Another part of the network literature uses
the set-valued approach, i.e., it either starts with a set of competitive price vectors and
shows that the resulting matches are pairwise stable and maximize aggregate welfare (see
Kranton and Minehart, 2000), or it starts by assuming that pairwise stable matches must
arise and then analyses the entry decision of agents (see Elliott, 2011b). Those papers
do not layout the game that leads to a competitive price vector or a pairwise stable
matching like we do. Finally, there is a growing number of papers that combine insights
from search and network theory.3 Those papers focus mainly on how social networks of
workers can pass information of the location of jobs on to each other which is diﬀerent
from the bipartite network (between workers and firms) framework in our paper.
Complete recall is essential to achieve eﬃcient network clearing. If firms can select
at most one candidate to which they are linked, the resulting equilibrium is typically not
constraint eﬃcient, since no price mechanism can resolve the coordination friction between
firms. In the search literature, Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) and Galeanos and
2Galeotti et al. (2010) analyse network games with limited information. However, they only consider
one type of agents, i.e., they do not consider vacancies and workers or sellers and buyers in a bipartite
network.
3Example include, Boorman (1975), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Calvó-Armengol and Zenou
(2004), Fontaine (2004).
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Kircher (2009) consider a framework with limited recall that leads to ineﬃcient network
clearing.4 In the network literature, Manea (2011) considers a network game that is
similar to a limited recall environment. He analyzes a framework, where agents that are
connected in a network are randomly selected to bargain. During the bargaining game
they are not able to contact other connected agents. We also show that complete recall
by itself like in Kircher (2009), where firms commit to their posted wages, does not lead
to the maximum number of matches.
Although a search environment without wage dispersion and with ex post competition
leads to eﬃcient network formation and network clearing, it may still be ineﬃcient in
other dimensions that we ignore here (i.e. search intensity and vacancy creation). Kircher
(2009) shows for example that eﬃcient entry and search intensity requires wage dispersion
and commitment. Combining our and his results, suggests that there may not exist a
decentralized mechanism that is eﬃcient in all dimensions.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in section 2 with a 3-by-3 example that
illustrates our main point that wage dispersion leads to less eﬃcient networks and ex post
Bertrand competition generates a maximum matching on a given network while wage
commitment does not. Sections 3 and 4 consider a large labor market. In section 3 we
describe the timing of events and the network formation and clearing process. In section
4 we apply some basic insights from graph theory to derive two important general results.
First, in section 4.1 we show that ex-post Bertrand competition with complete recall
gives the maximum matching on a given network and wage mechanisms without ex-post
competition do not. In section 4.3 we show that in terms of network formation, workers
should apply to each vacancy with equal probability. This only occurs, if all firms post
the same wage or if search is random (workers do not observe the wage ex ante). Finally
section 5 concludes.
2 An example
This section illustrates our main points that (i) ex ante wage dispersion leads to less eﬃ-
cient network formation and that (ii) ex post Bertrand competition generates a maximum
matching. We consider the following two dimensions corresponding to random network
formation and network clearing under incomplete information, (1) random search versus
directed search (note that random search implies that each vacancy receives an appli-
cation with the same probability), and (2) ex post Bertrand competition versus wage
4Albrecht et al. (2006) also allow ex post Bertrand competition.
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commitment.
Consider a simple economy with 3 unemployed workers and 3 firms, each with one
vacancy, (u = v = 3) and where workers send two applications (a = 2).5 First, we look at
network formation and assume that network clearing generates the maximum number of
matches. Then, we look at which wage mechanisms are most eﬃcient in terms of network
clearing. Eﬃcient network clearing implies that the number of matches is equal to 3, if
each of the three vacancies receives at least one application, and equal to 2, if only two
vacancies receive applications. Note that these are the only two possible outcomes, since
no worker sends both applications to the same firm. Let ξi be the probability that a
worker sends one of her two applications to vacancy i. The maximum number of matches
is,
M =
3X
i=1
¡
1− (1− ξi)3
¢
, with
3X
i=1
ξi = 2,
where (1− ξi)3 equals the probability that vacancy i does not get any application. Since
the function
¡
1− (1− ξi)3
¢
is concave in ξi, Jensen’s inequality implies that the number of
matches is maximized, if all vacancies have the same probability to receive an application,
i.e., if ξi = 2/3. Thus, only wage mechanisms that generate no ex ante wage dispersion
(which is always the case under random search) can lead to the maximum number of
matches, M = 26/9 ≈ 2.889. In Appendix A we consider four cases that depend on the
search environment (random or directed search) and on the firm’s strategy space (i.e.,
can firms increase their initial oﬀers or not). In all cases we allow for complete recall
(firms can go back and forth between their candidates) and fully characterize equilibrium
wages and the expected matching rates.6 It turns out that in this example, there is always
wage dispersion under directed search. So, interestingly, random search is most eﬃcient
in terms of network formation. In the case of directed search with ex-post competition,
the amount of wage dispersion is a lot smaller than in the case of commitment.7 In
5If workers send 1 application or 3 applications, the number of matches generated is independent of
the wage mechanism used.
6With the exception of Kircher (2009), who studies directed search with wage commitment, all those
cases have been studied with limited recall. For directed search with ex-post Bertrand competition, see
Albrecht et al. (2006), for random search with ex post competition see Gautier and Wolthoﬀ (2009),
for directed search with commitment and no ex post competition see Galeanos and Kircher (2009) and
for random search with commitment, see Gautier and Moraga Gonzalez (2004) (all those papers have no
complete recall except the last one, which considers complete recall in a 3by3 example).
7We conjecture that in a large market, the wage dipersion will completely disappear in the case with
ex post competition.
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this ex post competition case, only an equilibrium exists with one high wage and two
low wage firms. The high wage firm has an application probability of ξh ≈ 0.722 and
the low wage firms a probability of ξl ≈ 0.639 (the equilibrium is fully characterized in
Appendix A.3). The total number of matches is given by M ≈ 2.884. Under directed
search and wage commitment, there is more wage dispersion; the high wage firm has an
application probability of ξh ≈ 0.956 and the low wage firms of ξl ≈ 0.522 (details are in
A.4). As we will show below, in the case of directed search and wage commitment, both
network formation and network clearing is ineﬃcient. To isolate the eﬀect of the wage
mechanism on network formation we calculated the total number of matches, imposing
eﬃcient network clearing (which in general does not occur in equilibrium). In that case,
M ≈ 2.781. Summing up, directed search with ex post competition generates more
eﬃcient networks than without ex post competition, because the latter case has more
wage dispersion.
Next, consider network clearing. Eﬃcient network clearing requires that the number
of matches is equal to 3, if all three vacancies are collectively linked to all three workers,
and that the number of matches is equal to 2, if only two vacancies are collectively linked
to all three workers. The later is always ensured, since both vacancies with applications
received three applications and are linked to all three workers. To see why ex post Bertrand
competition leads to 3 matches, if three vacancies are collectively linked to three workers,
we show that one gets a contradiction if this does not hold. Suppose a worker and a
firm remain unmatched in this case. This implies that the unmatched worker receives her
reservation value. The firm that is linked to the unmatched worker must pay a wage equal
to the reservation value to its matched worker, since any higher wage would not be profit
maximizing. The unmatched firm, however, is willing to pay a wage equal to the marginal
product. Thus, the worker who is linked to the unmatched firm but hired by another firm
must be paid a wage equal to his marginal product, since any lower wage would be outbid
by the unmatched firm. Thus, one of the three firms pays the reservation wage, one the
marginal product and one remains unmatched. The unmatched worker cannot be linked
directly to the unmatched firm, since both parties would then form a match. Thus, the
unmatched worker can only be linked to both matched firms. This, however, implies that
both matched firms must pay a wage equal to the reservation value. This cannot be the
case as we argued above. Thus, ex post Bertrand competition leads to the maximum
number of matches possible.
Network clearing is in general not eﬃcient, if firms commit to their posted wages. To
see this, consider the graph in Figure 1, which pictures a particular realization of the
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Figure 1: Ineﬃciency without ex post competition
case where each worker sends one application to the high-wage firm and one to one of the
two low-wage firms (thick lines). The number of matches (dashed lines) now depends on
which worker is chosen by the high-wage firm. If the high-wage firm oﬀers the job to one
of the workers who are linked to the low-wage firm with two applicants, i.e., to worker
2 or 3 in Figure 1, the number of matches is equal to the maximum number of matches
(3). If the high-wage firm oﬀers the job to the worker linked to the low-wage firm with
only one applicant, i.e. to worker 1 in Figure 1, there will be only two matches, since
the low-wage firm with only one applicant will remain unmatched. The expected number
of matches in a model with directed search and wage commitment is therefore lower (in
Appendix A.4 we derive the equilibrium wages and show that M ≈ 2, 538). So without
ex post competition, the number of matches can even be ineﬃcient if all firms post the
same wage. In this case there also exists a positive probability that the worker that is
linked to the firm with only one applicant is hired by the firm with three applicants.
Network clearing is also not eﬃcient under random search with wage commitment.
Gautier and Moraga Gonzalez (2004) study such an environment and give a 3 by 3 exam-
ple, which we just summarize here. For the same reasons as in Burdett and Judd (1983)
and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) no symmetric-pure strategy equilibrium exists and
wages are oﬀered from a continuous distribution. The equilibrium wage distribution is
determined by the equal profit condition and the fact that the lowest wage oﬀer equals
the reservation value. The total number of matches is equal to M = 73/27 ≈ 2, 703.
The following table summarizes the expected number of matches that are realized in
equilibrium for the diﬀerent search environments and wage mechanisms.
This illustrates that the wage mechanism and the matching process are not inde-
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random search directed search
ex post competition 2, 889 2, 884
wage commitment 2, 703 2, 538
Table 1: Expected number of matches under diﬀerent search and wage mechanisms
pendent. Diﬀerent search environments generate diﬀerent distributions of networks and
whether the wage mechanism allows for ex post competition or not aﬀects the number of
trades on a given network.
3 Framework
Before presenting our main results for a large labor market, we first lay out the precize
setting and the timing of events. Consider v identical firms with one vacancy each and u
identical risk neutral unemployed workers, who can send a ≤ v applications to diﬀerent
firms. Workers have a reservation wage of 0 and a matched firm-worker pair produces 1.
As is standard in the directed search literature we impose both symmetry and anonymity.
Symmetry implies that identical workers play identical strategies while anonymity implies
that firms must treat identical workers similarly and vice versa (see Burdett, Shi and
Wright, 2001). In our directed search framework we allow firms to post a wage with the
possibility to Bertrand compete ex-post. Then, we compare our results to Kircher (2009)
where firms post fixed wages and cannot Bertrand compete ex-post. Random search
models can be analyzed in this framework by assuming that all firms post the reservation
wage (which is 0 here) in the first stage.
The timing is as follows:
1. Firms post a wage w. The actual wage w paid by the firm can be higher than the
posted wage, if firms can (Bertrand) compete for their candidates with other firms
that are also connected to this worker in later stages of the game.
2. Workers send out a ≥ 2 applications.
3. Each firm selects a worker (if present) and oﬀers the worker its posted wage w = w
from stage 1. The oﬀers are verifiable.
4. If a worker gets one oﬀer w, she informs all firms where she applied, except the
one that made the oﬀer, that she will only be willing to work for a wage w0 =
8
w + ² or higher. If a worker has multiple oﬀers {w1, w2, ..., wj}, she informs all
firms, where she applied, except the one that oﬀered the highest wage (wh =
argmax {w1, w2, ..., wj}), that she will only be willing to work for a wage w0 = wh+²
or higher.
5. If the worker that the firm selected did not ask for a higher wage, the firm oﬀers
the same wage w again. If the worker that the firm selected asks for a higher wage
w0 > w, the firm oﬀers one of the candidate(s) that did not ask for a wage higher
than w the job at the posted wage w. If there is no candidate with a request w0 ≤ w,
the firm picks the worker with the lowest request wl = argmin {w1, w2, ..., wj} and
oﬀers her the job at the wage wl, as long as the wage does not exceed the marginal
product, i.e., wl ≤ 1.
6. If at least one worker received a higher oﬀer than in the previous stage, the game
goes back to stage 4. If all workers received the same wage oﬀer as in the previous
stage, matches are formed. A firm fails to hire, if it has no applicants or if all its
candidates choose other firms. A worker remains unemployed, if she received no
oﬀers.
Note that workers and firms do not observe the network. Firms only know how many
workers applied to them and whether a worker is willing to work for the oﬀered wage. The
ability to go back and forth between workers constitutes a small but important diﬀerence
to the Bertrand game proposed by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006), where firms
can create a shortlist of two workers and cannot go back to a worker once they decided
to contact the next worker on the shortlist. The ability to go back and forth between
workers is, however, crucial to achieve eﬃcient network clearing.
In terms of network formation, our framework is similar to Albrecht et al. (2004).
This diﬀers from the standard random network formation process of Erdös-Renyi where
(in a labor market context) an application is sent to a particular firm with probability p.8
In our setting, all workers send a applications.9
Firms find it optimal to follow the strategies laid down in the Bertrand game above,
since they only have to increase their wage oﬀer, if none of their candidates is willing
to work for the wage oﬀered. Workers’ behavior in the proposed Bertrand game is also
optimal. They prefer to communicate that they have one or more oﬀers to the firms
8See Bollobas (2001) for a bipartite version.
9If there is no wage dispersion and the market is large, each application is sent with probability 1/v
to each firm.
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that did not respond in order to engage them into Bertrand competition. Furthermore,
since workers do not ask the firm that oﬀered the highest wage to increase its wage oﬀer,
workers make sure that these firms will not contact another worker and that they are at
least able to work for the highest wage oﬀered so far.
We take the number of applications that workers send out and market tightness as
given. The main reason for this is that the conditions for eﬃcient entry and the number
of applications are well known and have been studied before.10 This allows us to focus on
the eﬃciency of random network formation and clearing. It is however important to keep
in mind that a wage mechanism that generates eﬃcient networks may not be eﬃcient in
terms of market tightness or the number of applications and vice versa.
4 General results on random network formation and
network clearing
The example of section 2 suggests that ex ante wage dispersion is ineﬃcient in terms of
random network creation and that we need Bertrand competition in order to get eﬃcient
network clearing. In this section we use some results from graph theory to show that those
results hold in more general settings. In section 4.1 we show that maximum matching
requires ex post competition and in section 4.3 we show that it is desirable from a social
point of view that the application arrival rate is the same for all vacancies.
4.1 Maximum matching requires ex-post competition
In this section we show that for a given network, ex-post Bertrand competition with
complete recall generates a maximum matching. The network clearing mechanism that
is necessary to achieve a maximum matching also implies that committing ex-ante to
a specific wage without allowing for ex-post Bertrand competition does typically not
generate the maximum matching. Below, we first briefly describe some basic concepts of
graph theory that are relevant for our environment.
10Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2005) and Albrecht et al. (2006) find without recall, that workers
send too many applications (due to rent seeking and congestion externalities) and that entry is excessive,
because firms have too much market power. Kircher (2009) shows that with directed search, wage
commitment and full recall, entry and search intensity are socially eﬃcient. Elliot (2011b) finds eﬃcient
entry but workers send too many applications.
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When workers apply to jobs, each of their applications is a link (or edge) in a bipartite
network. The wage mechanism and search environment determine both the distribution
of networks that can arise and the matching on a given network. In our environment, a
typical network realization consists of several disjoint graphs. Each worker and firm is a
node (or vertex). The graphs in our environment are simple (workers do not send multiple
applications to the same firm), undirected ( if worker i is linked to firm j, then firm j is
linked to worker i) and bipartite (G = hu ∪ v, Li consists of a set of nodes formed by two
diﬀerent kind of agents, i.e., by workers {u1, ...un} and vacancies, {v1, ...vm}, and a set
of links L where each link connects a worker to a firm so workers are not linked to other
workers and firms are not linked to other firms).
Definition 1: A matching M in a graph G is a set of links such that every node of G
is in at most one link of M .
Central to our result that a maximum matching requires ex-post competition is the
following theorem by Berge,
Berge’s Theorem (1957):
A matching M in a graph G is a maximum matching if and only if G contains no M-
augmenting path.
In our bipartite graph environment an M-augmenting path is defined as a path where
1. worker-firm links that are part of the matching M alternate with worker-firm links
that are not part of the matching M (definition of an M-alternating path) and
2. neither the origin (firm or worker) nor the terminus (worker or firm) of the path is
part of the matching M .
Figure 2 depicts an M-alternating path and an M-augmenting path in a particular
network. The dots represent vacancies and the squares unemployed workers. The solid
lines represent applications (a = 2) and the dashed lines represent matched worker-firm
pairs. The M-alternating path (A− 1−B− 2−C − 4) starts with the matched vacancy
A and ends at the matched worker 4. The M-augmenting path (A− 1−B − 2−C − 4)
in the second panel of Figure 2 starts with an unmatched vacancy, A, and ends with an
unmatched worker, 4.
Berge’s Theorem, translated to our setting, implies that a maximum matching in a
graph is only guaranteed, if an unmatched firm is not linked to an unmatched worker via
an M-augmenting path. The reason that a matching is not optimal, if an M-augmenting
11
M-alternating path M-augmenting path
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
A B C A B C
Figure 2: M-alternating path and M-augmenting path
path exists is that one could create one more match by switching the links. Then, the
unmatched firm at the start of the M-augmenting path and the unmatched worker at
the end of the M-augmenting path will both be matched and all worker-firm pairs that
were matched before are rematched with another partner. Comparing the two paths in
the second panel of Figure 2 illustrates this. The matching M = {1−B, 2− C} in an
M-augmenting path can always be increased by switching the dashed and solid links
resulting in an extra link, i.e., M = {A− 1, B − 2, C − 4}.
1 2 3 4
A B C
Figure 3: The maximum matching has no M-augmenting path
What remains to be shown is that if a matching M has no M-augmenting paths it is
a maximum matching. This can be proven by contradiction. Suppose that in a particular
graph in our setting there is a matching N (A−1, B−2, C−4; i.e., dashed lines in Figure
12
3) with more links than M (1−B, 2− C; i.e., dotted lines in Figure 3) , i.e., |N | > |M |.
Then consider the symmetric diﬀerence N∆M defined as the set of links that is either in
N orM but not in both (the sum of dashed and dotted lines in Figure 3). Each worker or
firm can have at most 2 links in N∆M because it is hired by at most one firm in M and
at most one firm in N . Since by assumption N is strictly bigger than M there must be
at least one path in N∆M with an odd number of links that starts with a firm (worker)
in N and ends with a worker (firm) in N (i.e. A− 1−B − 2− C − 4). But then this is
an M-augmenting path because the firm and worker at the start and end of the path are
(by the symmetric diﬀerence operation) not in M .
Thus, in order to show that Bertrand competition leads to a maximum matching we
need to rule out that anM-augmenting path exists. In order to do so, we start with some
properties resulting from the ex-post Bertrand competition game in section 3.
Lemma 1 The highest posted wage is strictly smaller than 1.
Proof: Under directed search, any firm that oﬀers the highest wage and sets it equal to
1 makes no profit and could increase its profits by oﬀering a wage strictly less than one
since there is a positive probability that one of its candidates receives no better oﬀers
and accepts. If a = v, all firms know that they will hire a worker for sure. Since firms
make take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀers, it is optimal for them to always oﬀer the workers’
reservation wage. We can think of random search as the case where all posted wages are
zero. ¥
Lemma 2 If a worker remains unmatched, each firm along the M-alternating path that
starts with the unmatched worker pays no more than the highest posted minimum wage.
Proof. First, note that the unmatched worker cannot be linked to a firm with no other
candidates, since that firm would hire the worker. Next, suppose that the unmatched
worker applied to at least one firm with more than one other candidate. Since the worker
remains unmatched, any firm where the worker applied to must pay its matched worker
the wage it posted (under random search, it will pay the reservation wage). Otherwise,
it could oﬀer the unmatched worker its posted wage and the worker would accept this
oﬀer given that his reservation wage equals zero. Suppose now that contrary to Lemma
2, one of the firms along an M-alternating path (firm B), pays more than the highest
posted wage, i.e. w∗ > wh. We will show that this violates profit maximization. Since
any of the other firms that is linked to the unmatched worker pays its posted wage to its
matched worker, there exists anM-alternating path that starts at the unmatched worker
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and includes at least one firm that pays its posted wage and firm B that pays w∗ > wh.
But then there exists a firm (possibly firm B) along the M-alternating path that pays a
wage w∗ > wh, but has an applicant that earns wh or less. This firm could make higher
profits, if it would oﬀer the other applicant the job at a wage wh+ ε (note that each firm
on an M-alternating path must have another candidate). ¥
Lemma 3 If a firm remains unmatched, then all workers along the M-alternating path
that starts with the unmatched firms must earn a wage equal to the marginal product, i.e.,
w = 1.
Proof. If a firm with candidates (firm A) remains unmatched, then its applicants must
earn a wage w = 1, since at any wage w < 1, the firm could attract an applicant and
make positive profits. Suppose there exists a firm, call it firm B, that pays a wage w∗ < 1
to its matched worker. Then, there exists at least one firm along the M-alternating path
that starts at the unmatched firm A and includes firm B that pays a wage w = 1, while
the worker who is hired at B earns w∗ < 1. But then this firm that pays a wage w = 1
could make higher profits, if it would oﬀer one of its other candidates (again, each firm on
an M-alternating path must have another candidate) the job at the wage w∗ + ε. Thus,
if one firm along an M-alternating path pays a wage equal to the marginal product, all
firms along the M-alternating path must do so as well. ¥
According to Berge’s Theorem a maximum matching exists if and only if there is no
M-alternating path that starts with an unmatched worker and ends with an unmatched
firm, i.e., if and only if there is no M-augmented path. Given the wage pattern in an M-
alternating path that starts with an unmatched worker (Lemma 2) or with an unmatched
firm (Lemma 3), we can write down our main Theorem.
Theorem 1: Ex-post Bertrand competition leads to a maximum matching in all graphs
of the network.
Proof: Suppose it would not lead to a maximum matching. In that case there would
exist an M-augmenting path with at least one unmatched worker and one unmatched
firm. But then Lemma 1,2 and 3 imply that all firms along theM-augmenting path (that
is also anM-alternating path) oﬀer both a wage less than 1 and a wage equal to 1, which
is a contradiction. ¥
The flexibility to adjust wages ex-post is central to achieve eﬃciency in network clear-
ing. If firms commit to their posted wages and do not adjust their wages ex-post, we can
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typically observe diﬀerent wages along an M-alternating path. If both end nodes of the
M-alternating path are unmatched, i.e., if we have an M-augmenting path, there is no
mechanism inherent in the matching process associated with wage commitment that can
induce the matched firm-worker pairs to rematch with the unmatched firm and worker at
the end of the M-augmenting path. Thus, if firms commit not to increase their posted
wages ex-post, network clearing is generally not eﬃcient. Note, that the 3 by 3 model of
section 2 also gives an example where network clearing is not eﬃcient due to the lack of
Bertrand competition. Thus, Berge’s Theorem also implies the following Corollary:
Corollary 1: If firms commit not to increase their posted wages ex-post, network clearing
is typically ineﬃcient and the maximum matching is not realized.
Corollary 1 shows that directed search models with fixed posted wages are not able to
solve the second coordination friction (firms do not know which workers are considered
by other firms). Thus, although directed search with fixed posted wages is constraint
eﬃcient in terms of firm entry and number of applications that workers send, see Kircher
(2009), it generally does not generate the maximum matching that is possible given the
network that is formed between firms and their applicants.
Theorem 1 also implies that a social planner would never want to give one subgroup
of firms the right to match first regardless of the network. Such a property arises, if some
firms oﬀer higher wages than others and wages cannot be raised ex-post as in Kircher
(2009).
Corollary 2: It is socially ineﬃcient to have a subgroup of firms that matches first.
Corollary 2 implies that it is socially ineﬃcient to have a subgroup of high wage firms
that match first and a subgroup of low wage firms that match only if their candidate(s)
receive no oﬀers at a high wage firm.11
4.2 Wages
Lemmas 1 to 3 are also informative about the payoﬀs that workers and firms receive.
According to Lemma 3 all workers that are part of an M-alternating path that includes
an unmatched firm earn a wage equal to the marginal product, i.e., w = 1, if firms can ex
post Bertrand compete for their candidates. Lemmas 1 to 3 also imply that all workers
11Note, that Kircher’s (2009) equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient because the planner takes the existence
of a subset of firms that match first as given, whereas here this is not part of the planner’s constraint.
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that are part of such an M-alternating path, must be matched and earn a wage equal to
their marginal product. Thus, these M-alternating paths are characterized by an excess
number of firms. Similarly, there are M-alternating paths that are characterized by an
excess number of workers. According to Lemma 2 all workers that are part of such an
M-alternating path earn a wage no higher than the highest posted wage. Lemmas 1 to 3
also imply that all firms that are part of such an M-alternating path must be matched.
Lemmas 1 to 3 also allow forM-alternating paths with equal number of workers and firms
where all workers and firms are matched. In order to determine the wages paid in such
even subgraphs we use the properties of the Decomposition Theorem by Corominas-Bosch
(2004), which — in terms of our terminology — decomposes a network into firm-, worker-
and even subgraphs. A firm subgraph contains more firms than workers and workers are
paid their marginal product. A worker subgraph contains more workers than firms and
workers are paid a wage no higher than the highest posted wage. In even subgraphs the
number of workers equals the number of firms.
Decomposition Theorem (Corominas-Bosch, 2004):
(1) Every graph G can be decomposed into a number of firm subgraphs (Gf1 ,..., G
f
nf
),
worker subgraphs (Gw1 ,..., G
w
nw) and even subgraphs (G
e
1,..., G
e
ne) in such a way that each
node (firm or worker) belongs to one and only one subgraph and any firm (worker) in
a firm-(worker-)subgraph Gfi,(G
w
i, ) is only linked to workers (firms) in a firm-(worker-
)subgraph Gfj (G
w
j ).
(2) Moreover, a given node (firm or worker) always belongs to the same type of subgraph
for any such decomposition. We will write G = Gf1∪...∪Gfnf ∪G
w
1 ∪...∪Gwnw ∪Ge1∪...∪Gene,
with the union being disjoint.
Such a decomposition into firm-, worker- and even subgraphs plus some extra links can
be obtained by following an algorithm introduced by Corominas-Bosch (2004), see step
2 in Appendix C for the exact algorithm. The algorithm first looks for firm subgraphs
and separates all of them from the network. Then it identifies worker subgraphs and
removes all of them from the network. The remaining subgraphs are even subgraphs.
The decomposition is not unique, since the exact splitting of nodes (firms or workers) into
subgraphs can diﬀer, because the algorithm uses the subindex of a node in order to start
finding the subgraphs. The second statement of the Decomposition Theorem, however,
states that any firm and any worker will always belong to the same type of subgraph,
a property important to guarantee that the diﬀerent possible decompositions are payoﬀ
equivalent.
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Figure 4: Graph-Decomposition
Figure 4 illustrates the Decomposition Theorem. The algorithm starts with the first
firm and identifies a set of firms as firm subgraph if it has less neighbors (more precisely,
if it is jointly linked to less neighbors, i.e., |F | < |N (F )|). In order to ensure that the
maximum matching is found, the algorithm has to start with |F | = 1. The number
|F | increases by one once, all firm combinations with |F | have been considered (Hall’s
Theorem, 1935). The first subgraph in Figure 4 is the unmatched firm G. The firm
subgraphGf1 is removed before the algorithm continues. Since there are no firm subgraphs
with |F | = 2, the next firm subgraph has three firms, i.e., |F | = 3, The three firms A, B
and C in this subgraph are collectively linked to workers 1 and 2, i.e., N ({A,B,C}) =
{1, 2} and |N ({A,B,C})| = 2. Once the firm-subgraph Gf2 is removed, it is easy to
identify that the remaining sets of firms are collectively linked to more neighbors, i.e.,
|F | ≥ |N (F )|. Hence, there are no further firm subgraphs. The algorithm continues
by looking for worker subgraphs in the same way as it looked for firm subgraphs. At
|W | = 4, the algorithm identifies a worker subgraph with N ({3, 4, 5, 6}) = {D,E,F}
and |N ({3, 4, 5, 6})| = 3. Once the worker subgraph Gw1 is removed, and no further
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worker subgraph are found the algorithm stops by identifying all remaining subgraphs as
even subgraphs, i.e., in Figure 4 the remaining subgraph Ge1 is an even subgraph with
N ({7, 8}) = {H, I} and |N ({7, 8})| = 2 = |{H, I}|.
The decomposition theorem of Corominas-Bosch (2004) is also useful for the analysis of
network formation that we discuss in the next section, because it allows us to determine
which kind of links formed by an additional application will result in an extra match.
Since all firms in even subgraphs and worker subgraphs are matched, only applications
from workers in worker subgraphs (which includes unmatched workers) to firms in firm
subgraphs (which include firms without any application) will result in additional matches.
An alternative way to interpret the decomposition is in terms of splitting firms and
workers into ”strong”, ”weak” and ”even” firms and workers depending on their capability
to extract the maximum surplus from their matched partners (see Corominas-Bosch, 2004,
p. 51). Workers in firm subgraphs are ”strong” nodes, since they earn a wage equal to
their marginal product. Similarly, firms in worker subgraphs are ”strong” nodes, since
they are able to extract the maximum surplus conditional on the posted wage. Contrary,
workers in worker subgraphs and firms in firm subgraphs are ”weak” nodes and workers
and firms in even subgraphs are even nodes. The first part of the Decomposition Theorem
states that a worker (firm) in a worker-(firm-)subgraph can only be connected to firms
(worker) in other worker-(firm-)subgraphs, which implies that ”weak” nodes can only be
linked to ”strong” nodes. This also implies that ”even” nodes cannot be linked to ”weak”
nodes, or in terms of our model, that firms in even subgraphs cannot be linked to workers
in worker subgraphs or that workers in even subgraphs cannot be linked to firms in firm
subgraphs. Thus, the outside option of workers in even subgraphs is at most the highest
posted wage, since they can only be linked to firms in even subgraphs or worker subgraphs.
This last property is important to determine the wages in even subgraphs.
Lemma 4 (i) Firms in firm subgraphs pay a wage equal to the marginal product.
(ii) Firms in worker subgraphs pay a wage no higher than the highest posted wage.
(iii) Firms in even subgraphs pay a wage no higher than the highest posted wage.
Proof: (i) and (ii) follow immediately from Lemmas 1 to 3. To prove (iii) consider the
following properties of an even subgraph. In an even subgraph that results from the
decomposition algorithm introduced by Corominas-Bosch (2004), workers are either linked
to firms in even or in worker subgraphs. Part (ii) of the Lemma implies that the wage
oﬀers made by firms in worker subgraphs to workers in even subgraphs are no higher than
the highest posted wage. To establish part (iii) it remains to be shown that firms in even
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subgraphs never have an incentive to oﬀer a wage above the highest posted wage given
the Bertrand game outlined in section 3. A firm only increases its wage oﬀer above the
highest posted wage, if all workers that are linked to it ask for a wage above the highest
posted wage. According to Step 4 of the Bertrand game a worker only asks for a wage
above the highest posted wage, if at least one of the firms, where the worker applied to,
oﬀers him a wage above the highest posted wage. The first firm that oﬀers a wage above
the highest posted wage cannot be part of the even subgraph. If it were part of the even
subgraph, then another firm that is also part of the even subgraph must have oﬀered a
wage above the highest posted wage before. Thus, no firm in an even subgraph can be
the first to oﬀer a wage above the highest posted wage. ¥
Directed search with ex post competition generates ex post wage dispersion similar to
Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006). The knowledge about wages paid in the diﬀerent
subgraphs allows us also to gain some insight into the payoﬀs that firms get in diﬀerent
subgraphs. This will be useful for analyzing eﬃciency in network formation.
4.3 Eﬃcient network formation
In our setting, network formation is random. The symmetry and anonymity assumptions
do not allow workers to identify certain firms and to condition their application decision
on firms’ names. The limited information available to workers leads to random network
formation.12 Workers might, however, know certain characteristics of firms, for example
the posted wage, and condition their application decision on those observed characteristics.
We consider an urn-ball model of network formation, (see Albrecht, Gautier and Vro-
man, 2004) where workers randomly send out a applications to diﬀerent firms.13 Each
application can be thought of as creating a link in a bipartite graph. This process diﬀers
from the seminal Erdös and Rényi (1960) random network formation model where each
link is formed with a certain probability and the number of applications that a worker
sends is a random variable. In our framework the number of applications that each worker
sends is given and the randomness comes from the fact that workers do not know where
other workers apply. The number of applications that a firm receives is therefore a ran-
dom variable. Under directed search, the expected number of applications a firm receives
12Network formation is deterministic, if workers decide on whether to establish a link based on the
existing network. Examples for deterministic network formation are Kranton and Minehart (2001) and
Elliott (2011a).
13See also Kircher (2009) and Galeanos and Kircher (2009) and Fontaine (2004).
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will of course depend on the wage (or more generally on the wage mechanism) it posts.
If we make the labor market large in the usual way, by letting u, v → ∞ with v/u = θ,
the number of applications are distributed according to a Poisson distribution with mean
a/θ.
Diﬀerent wage mechanisms will generate diﬀerent distributions of networks and diﬀer-
ent matchings. In equilibria where firms post mechanisms that imply the same expected
payoﬀ, it is optimal for risk neutral workers to randomize between firms. If firms, however,
post mechanisms that imply diﬀerent expected payoﬀs, equilibrium requires that low-wage
firms (who make more profit per worker, if they hire a worker) receive less applications
(so that they are less likely to hire) than high-wage firms. Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2006) for example show in a directed search framework where firms post an auction with
a minimum bid that all firms post the same wage (equal to the reservation wage), while
Galeanos and Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009) show that, if firms post fixed wages and
commit not to Bertrand compete ex post, firms post diﬀerent wages. Below, we show
that wage dispersion is socially not eﬃcient in terms of network formation.
4.3.1 Social planner’s problem
An unconstrained social planner will trivially assign each unemployed workers to a vacancy
such that the number of matches equals the short side of the market. If workers send out
multiple applications, the same first best assignment can be achieved, if the social planner
partitions the labor market into submarkets where the number of firms and workers in
each submarket is no higher than the number of applications. However, if the social
planner faces the same coordination frictions as the market, he must assign symmetric
strategies to identical workers implying that he can only decide about the probability with
which a worker sends an application to a subgroup of firms.
We constrain the social planner to choose the set of firm-subgroups C (where each
subgroup c is defined by a certain color), the measure of vacancies vc within each subgroup
c and the probability pc,i that a worker sends its i-th application to subgroup c ∈ C. The
expected number of applications sent to subgroup c is equal to
ac = u
Xa
i=1
pc,i.
The total number of workers uc that applies to subgroup c can be less than the total
number of links (or applications ac) between firms of subgroup c and unemployed workers,
if workers send more than one application to one subgroup. The total number of workers
that applied to subgroup c is given by uc = (1−
Qa
i=1 (1− pc,i))u, where
Qa
i=1 (1− pc,i)
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equals the probability that a given unemployed worker does not send any application to
subgroup c. While vacancies can by definition only be part of one subgroup, workers can
be linked to at most a diﬀerent subgroups depending on where they send their applications
to. Workers are, however, only part of one subgraph (worker-, firm- or even subgraph).
Subgraphs can, therefore, contain vacancies of diﬀerent subgroups, if the workers that
belong to that subgraph are linked to vacancies in diﬀerent subgroups.
The maximum matching that is achieved by ex-post competition implies that the
number of matches within each subgroup c equals the number of workers in firm subgraphs
ufc , the number of firms in worker subgraphs v
w
c and the number of firms (or workers) in
even subgraphs vec or (u
e
c) i.e. Mc = u
f
c +v
w
c +v
e
c . Using the fact that the sum of vacancies
equals the sum of vacancies in firm-, worker- and even subgraphs, i.e. vc = vfc +v
w
c +v
e
c , we
can rewrite the expected number of matches in a subgroup c as the number of vacancies
in subgroup c minus the number of vacancies in subgroup c in firm subgraphs that are
not matched, i.e.,
Mc = vc −
¡
vfc − ufc
¢
. (1)
Coromina-Bosch’s Decomposition Theorem allows us also to derive the first derivatives
of the matching function with respect to an additional application.14 Since all firms in
worker- and even subgraph are matched, only applications to firms in firm subgraphs can
result in additional matches. In addition, an application will only lead to an additional
match, if the worker who sends the application is not part of an even or firm subgraph
(since all workers in even or firm subgraphs are already matched). In other words the
worker must be part of a worker subgraph. The probability that a vacancy is part of a
firm subgraph in subgroup c is vfc /vc and the probability that a worker is part of a worker
subgraphs is uw/u, where uw is the number of unemployed workers in worker subgraphs.
An additional application of a randomly selected worker therefore leads with the following
probability to an additional match,
4Mc
4ac =
vfc
vc
uw
u
. (2)
Any additional match that is formed by a link of a vacancy in a firm subgraph and a
worker in a worker subgraph decreases the excess number of firms in firm subgraphs, i.e.
decreases vfc −ufc . If the excess number of firms in a particular subgrapth is equal to one,
then this additional match turns vacancies located in firm subgraphs into vacancies in
14Note, that a marginal increase in the expected number of applications results form a marginal increase
in the application probability pc,i.
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even-subgraphs. Thus, an additional link decreases the expected number of firms in firm
subgraphs. Furthermore, any additional match that is formed by a link between a vacancy
in a firm subgraph and a worker in a worker subgraph reduces the number of workers in
worker subgraphs uw. This implies that the number of matches in any subgroup c is a
concave function of the number of applications, i.e.,
42Mc
4a2c
=
1
vc
uw
u
4vfc
4ac +
vfc
vc
1
u
4uw
4ac < 0, since
4vfc
4ac < 0 and
4uw
4ac < 0. (3)
Although we do not know the exact form of the matching function, these properties of
the matching function are suﬃcient to characterize the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for eﬃcient network formation.
The social planner chooses the set of firm-subgroups C, the measure of firms vc within
each subgroup c and the total number of applications ac that unemployed workers send
to vacancies in each subgroup c, i.e.,
max
C,vc,ac
X
c∈C
Mc.
Note, that choosing the total number of applications ac is (by the law of large numbers)
equivalent to choosing the probability pc,i that a worker sends its i-th application to
subgroup c, since symmetry requires that all workers use the same application strategy.
Theorem 2: (i) Network formation is eﬃcient, if and only if
vfc
vc
=
vf
v
for all c ∈ C. (4)
which is equivalent to having the same application intensity in each subgroup, i.e.,
vc
ac
=
v
au
for all c ∈ C. (5)
(ii) Eﬃcient network formation is independent of the set C of subgroups and the number
of vacancies vc in each subgroup.
Proof: We prove part (i) by showing that the number of matches is only maximized,
if vfc /vc = v
f/v for all c ∈ C. Suppose that the probability of a firm being in a firm
subgraph is higher in the red subgroup r ∈ C than in the blue subgroup b ∈ C, i.e.
vfr /vr > v
f
b /vb.
15 This implies according to equation (2) the following relationship for the
15Note, if no worker applied to subgroup c, then all firms in subgroup c are in firm-subgraphs, i.e.
vfc /vc = 1.
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marginal matches generated by an additional application, i.e.,
vfr
vr
>
vfb
vb
⇐⇒ 4Mr4ar >
4Mb
4ab .
Given that the matching function is concave in the number of applications, see equation
(3), the total number of matches in subgroups r and b can be increased by redirecting
applications from subgroup b to subgroup r, until
4Mr
4ar =
4Mb
4ab ⇐⇒
vfr
vr
=
vfb
vb
.
Since the same argument applies for all c ∈ C, condition (4) must hold in order to
maximize the total number of matches for a given set of subgroups C.
Condition (4) holds, because the number of applications ac directed to each subgroup
is adjusted accordingly. This implies that the number of applications to each subgroup is
proportional to the number of vacancies in each subgroup, i.e.,
ac
vc
=
au
v
for all c ∈ C.
To prove part (ii) we show that conditional on vfc /vc = v
f/v and ac/vc = au/v for
all c ∈ C, the total number of matches is independent of the number of subgroups C
and the number of vacancies vc within each subgroup. If market tightness is the same in
all subgroups, i.e. condition (5) holds by symmetry, the number of unemployed workers
matched with vacancies in each subgroup must also be proportional to the number of
vacancies in each subgroup. This is also true for each subtype of matched workers, i.e.,
for workers in worker-, firm- and even subgraphs. Thus, the number of matched workers ufc
that are part of firm subgraphs in subgroup c are proportional to the number of vacancies
in subgroup c, i.e.,
ufc
vc
=
uf
v
for all c ∈ C.
Using this last equality and condition (4) implies that the total number of matches is
independent of the set C of subgroups and the number of vacancies vc in each subgroup,
i.e., X
c∈C
Mc =
X
c∈C
£
vc −
¡
vfc − ufc
¢¤
=
X
c∈C
vc
∙
1−
µ
vfc
vc
− u
f
c
vc
¶¸
=
∙
1−
µ
vf
v
− u
f
v
¶¸X
c∈C
vc
= v −
¡
vf − uf
¢
.
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where the third step applies equality (4).¥
The eﬃciency condition for network formation in Theorem 2 implies that all vacancies
should have the same probability to be contacted by a worker. This makes the network as
balanced as possible and therefore minimizes the fraction of firms that are not matched.
Shimer (2005) derives a similar condition for a directed search environment where work-
ers can apply to only one firm. In the setting by Galeanos and Kircher (2009), where
workers can send more than one application but firms can contact only one worker, the
total number of matches is also maximized, if all firms have the same probability to be
contacted by a worker. In contrast, the eﬃciency condition in Kircher (2009), where
workers send multiple applications and firms can contact all workers, diﬀers from our
eﬃciency condition, because he constraints the social planner to let a subgroup of firms
always match first (i.e. be in a high location). Those firms in a high location should be
more likely to be contacted by a worker, since this reduces the probability that a worker
is not available for hiring at a firm in a low location (where firms can only match, if
their candidates do not have an oﬀer from a firm in a high location). Allowing the social
planner to also choose the network clearing mechanism, Corollary 2 shows that it is not
optimal to let a subgroup of firms match first. Thus, Kircher’s (2009) eﬃciency result
diﬀers from our eﬃciency result, because he restricts the social planner to use a network
clearing mechanism that does not allow for ex post Bertrand competition.
The second part of Theorem 2 also implies that the total number of matches does not
change, if there are no firm subgroups. The simulated examples in the next section show
that this property only holds for a large number of workers and firms. If the labor market
is small, the expected number of matches decreases, if firms are partitioned into diﬀerent
subgroups. Thus, random search, where no subgroups exist, generates a socially eﬃcient
distribution of networks for any market size.
Corollary 3: Random search leads to eﬃcient network formation.
Random search leads to evenly distributed links between workers and firms and there-
fore minimizes the expected number of workers in worker subgraphs and the expected
number of firms in firm subgraphs. A large part of firms in firm subgraphs are firms
without an application.16 The following Proposition shows when this event is least likely.
16As we will show in the next section, if a is small relatively to u and v, and θ = 1, this is the main
reason for a firm not to hire a worker.
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Proposition 1: If workers fully randomize, the fraction of vacancies without applicants
is minimized.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Although random search leads to eﬃcient network formation, Theorem 2 does not
directly imply that directed search with diﬀerent posted wages and ex-post competition
leads to ineﬃcient network formation. Using Lemma 4, however, implies that the equal
profit condition for high- and low-wage firms violates condition (4), which is necessary to
get eﬃcient network formation.
Proposition 2: If equally productive firms post diﬀerent wages, network formation is not
eﬃcient.
Proof:We prove this Proposition by showing that the equal profit condition, which must
hold if equally productive firms post diﬀerent wages, implies vfL/vL > v
f
H/vH , if wH > wL.
Lemma 4 implies that all firms earn zero profit, if they are part of a firm subgraph, since
they pay a wage equal to the worker’s marginal product. High wage firms in even or
worker subgraphs earn 1 − wH . Low wage firms earn more. If they are part of an even
(or worker-)subgraph, they pay with probability πe (or πw) their low posted wage wL and
with probability 1−πe (or (1− πw)) the high posted wage wH . Note that the appropriate
probabilities satisfy π > 0, since there exists a positive probability that a low wage firm
does not have to compete with a high wage firm for a worker in an even or a worker
subgraph.
The equal profit condition of high and low wage firms is, therefore, given by
vfH
vH
[1− 1] +
∙
veH
vH
+
vwH
vH
¸
[1− wH ]
=
vfL
vL
[1− 1] + v
e
L
vL
[1− πewL − (1− πe)wH ] +
vwL
vL
[1− πwwL − (1− πw)wH ]
Rearranging and noting that v
f
c
vc
+ v
e
c
vc
+ v
w
c
vc
= 1 implies"
vfL
vL
− v
f
H
vH
#
[1− wH ] =
∙
vwL
vL
πw +
veL
vL
πe
¸
[wH − wL] .
Since wH > wL, it follows immediately that v
f
L/vL > v
f
H/vH . ¥
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4.3.2 Simulations
To illustrate that randomization is desirable when agents do not know the network we
numerically compare randomization with the case where a subset of the vacancies has a
higher arrival rate of applications. The details of our algorithm are given in Appendix
C. The basic steps of the algorithm are as follows. First, we color a fraction q of the
vacancies blue and a fraction (1 − q) green and let each worker send one application
to a blue vacancy and the other (a− 1) applications to a green one. Each blue vacancy
receives an application from worker 1 with probability 1/qv and the same for workers 2,...,
u. For the a = 3 example, each green vacancy gets with probability, (a− 1) /(1 − q)v,
the second application of worker 1 and if it did not get the second one, it gets the third
one with probability (a− 2) / ((1− q)v − 1) etc. The same holds for the other workers.
For q = 1/a, the arrival rate at each firm is the same and the only diﬀerence to full
randomization is that the market is partitioned. Since we want to focus on network
formation here, we assume maximum matching on each realized network. If for example
blue vacancies would have a priority in matching (e.g. if they oﬀer higher wages) as in
Kircher (2009), the number of matches could be lower than we report here.
a pn E(M) var(M) I/v J/u
joint
2 1.343 10.416 0.812 0.012 0.061
3 0.377 11.554 0.382 0.045 0.343
6 0.003 11.997 0.003 0.000 0.003
partitioned (q = 1
3
)
2 1.748 10.064 0.875 0.187 0.684
3 0.405 11.533 0.387 0.046 0.347
6 0.124 11.876 0.111 0.010 0.122
partitioned (q = 1
6
)
2 2.851 9.137 0.945 0.242 0.675
3 0.719 11.206 0.540 0.075 0.510
6 0.005 11.995 0.005 0.000 0.005
Table 2: Simulation results for v = u = 12
Let the fraction of firms in firm subgraphs be I/v and the fraction of workers in worker
subgraphs be J/u. Let pn be the probability that a firm receives no workers, and finally
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let var(M) be the variance of applicants that a particular firm receives. Below we present
simulation results for v = u = 12. We generate a sample of 1000 networks for each case.
In Table 2 below, we present the probability that a firm receives no workers pn, the mean
and variance of the number of matchesM , the average number of firms in firm subgraphs
and the average number of workers in worker subgraphs for diﬀerent values of a, q.
We see that partitioning the market reduces the expected number of matches but that
for q = 1
a
(those rows are in bold), the arrival rate at each firm is the same and the
diﬀerence with the fully random case is relatively small. We also see that if a is large
relatively to v, that partitioning hardly matters. Firms are swamped with applications
and almost all firms and workers are connected, implying that the number of matches is
close to 12.
Figure 5 below, shows the distribution of matches for the case where all firms are part
of one group (i.e., workers fully randomize) and Figure 6 shows the case where 1/3 of the
vacancies are blue and each worker sends one of their applications to a blue vacancy.
Figure 5: u = v = 12, a = 2
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Figure 6: u = v = 12, a = 2, q = 1/3
We find that the cdf in the full randomization case first order stochastically dominates
the one in the partitioning case. Under randomization, the probability that less than 11
matches are formed is about 70% while under randomization this is only about 50%.
5 Final remarks
This paper contributes to one of the fundamental question in economics namely under
which conditions do decentralized markets generate constraint eﬃcient outcomes. Our
focus is on the labor market where it is common that unemployed workers simultaneously
send multiple applications which creates a bipartite network between workers and firms.
In such an environment there are two coordination frictions, (i) workers do not know where
other workers apply to and (ii) firms do not know which workers are considered by other
firms. We show that the second coordination friction between firms can be eliminated, if
wages in the decentralized market are determined by ex-post Bertrand competition and if
firms can go back and forth between their applicants. The number of matches on a given
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network that is formed, if workers send multiple applications to firms, equals the maximum
matching possible. The first coordination friction is minimized if the decentralized market
ensures that workers apply to each vacancy with equal probability. This implies that an
equilibrium with wage dispersion is ineﬃcient in terms of network formation.
Although a wage mechanism that has ex-post Bertrand competition and no wage
dispersion is eﬃcient in terms of network formation and clearing, it will most likely not
be eﬃcient in other dimensions like vacancy creation and search intensity (number of
applications). Kircher (2009) shows for example that wage commitment without ex post
competition implies wage dispersion and that the resulting equilibrium is eﬃcient in terms
of search intensity and firm entry. Combining those results suggests that there may not
exist a wage mechanism that by itself generates the constrained eﬃcient outcome.
An important and interesting extension for future research is to allow for heterogeneity
in firm and or worker types, see Shimer (2005). We conjecture that this makes ex post
Bertrand competition equally desirable as in a homogenous firm world, because high
productive firms should be able to outbid low productive firms. Furthermore, this will
make directed search more desirable than in our setting because high productive firms
should be able to signal their types in order to get matched with a higher probability.
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6 Appendix
A Derivations 3 by 3 example
In this appendix we characterize the full recall equilibrium and determine the number
of matches for a simple economy with 3 unemployed workers and 3 firms, each with one
vacancy (u = v = 3). As we stated in section 3, firms do not know the realization of
the network but only observe how many candidates they have and they can go to their
candidates back and forth with higher wage oﬀers as often as they like (complete recall).
Workers have a reservation wage of 0 and a matched firm-worker pair produces 1.
If workers apply to 1 or all 3 jobs, all wage mechanisms that we consider generate the
same distribution of networks and they clear equally eﬃcient. Therefore, we focus on the
case where workers send two applications (a = 2). We take the number of applications
and the number of firms as given but it is important to note that if they were to be
endogenized, an equilibrium with a = 2 and v = 3 only exists for a particular set of
application and entry cost. Only for the random-search with Bertrand competition case,
this equilibrium will not exist without a positive minimum wage because the payoﬀ for
a worker would be 0 in this 3 by 3 example. This can simply be solved by introducing
a minimum wage w = w. 17 We consider the following cases. First, we look at random
search: (i) with ex-post Bertrand competition, and (ii) with wage posting and no Bertrand
competition. Then, we look at directed search models where workers observe the posted
wages ex-ante and they can direct their applications to a particular wage. Also in this
case, we consider: (i) ex-post Bertrand competition, and (ii) wage commitment and no
Bertrand competition. The maximum number of matches according to Hall’s marriage
17Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2005) and Albrecht et al. (2006) find that workers send too many
applications because of rent seeking and that entry is excessive because firms have too much market
power. Kircher (2009) shows that with directed search and full recall, entry and search intensity are
socially eﬃcient.
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market theorem is 23/8 ' 2.889. This is realized under random search with Bertrand
competition. In this case there is no wage dispersion and we get a maximum matching on
each realized network. Under directed search with Bertrand competition, the expected
number of matches is slightly less (2.884) because there is a little bit of wage dispersion (we
conjecture that this disappears in a larger market). Random search with wage posting
generates 2.703 matches on average. The lack of Bertrand competition leads to fewer
than the maximum number of matches on all network realizations. Directed search with
commitment generates even more wage dispersion than the directed search with ex-post
Bertrand competition. The ex-ante wage dispersion and the lack of Bertrand competition
leads to fewer than the maximum number of matches on a given network. On average
2.538 matches are realized in that case.
A.1 Random search with ex-post competition
This case has been studied in Gautier and Wolthoﬀ (2009) without recall and with hetero-
geneous firms. In a random search equilibrium, where firms are able to compete ex-post,
firms will first oﬀer a wage equal to the workers’ reservation wage or to the legal minimum
wage, w = w. Since all firms are identical and Bertrand competition assures that on each
realized network the maximum number of matches is realized, a firm only fails to match
if it has no candidates. So the matching probability is
¡
1− (1− 2/3)3
¢
and the aggregate
number of matches is given by
M = 3
Ã
1−
µ
1− 2
3
¶3!
=
26
9
= 2.889.
Note that in this 3 by 3 example this equilibrium is hard to sustain with positive ap-
plication cost and without a legal minimum wage. Absent a minimum wage, the worker’s
payoﬀ is zero because firms who have 2 or 3 candidates will not have to increase their ini-
tial bids. With a suﬃciently high minimum wage, even workers with a positive application
cost will participate.
A.2 Random search equilibrium with wage commitment
This case has been studied before by Gautier and Moraga Gonzalez (2005) with limited
and full recall. Since they also give a 3 by 3 example we just summarize their results here.
For the same reasons as in Burdett Judd (1983) and Burdett Mortensen (1998) there exists
no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in wages. For any candidate equilibrium wage
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or mass point below the marginal product, there exists a profitable ε upward deviation
that gives a discrete jump in payoﬀs (because the deviant always wins the race against
rivals who stick to that candidate equilibrium). The wage distribution is determined by
a firm-indiﬀerence condition. The expected payoﬀ for a firm oﬀering w while the other
firms oﬀer a wage from F (w) is given by (see Gautier and Moraga Gonzalez (2005) for a
derivation),
πi(w;F (w)) =
£
p1F 2(w) + 2p2F (w) [1− F (w)] + p3 [1− F (w)]2
¤
(1− w) (6)
where p1, p2 and p3 are the probabilities that a firm oﬀering the highest, second highest
and lowest wage in the market hires a worker, which are derived in Gautier and Moraga
Gonzalez (2004). The lowest wage that is oﬀered must be the worker’s reservation wage or
the minimum wage implying that F (w) = 0 so πi(w;F (w)) = p3 = πi(w;F (w)) where the
last equality follows from the equal profit condition. This can be used to solve for F (w)
in (6). If workers send out 2 applications then firms choose wages from the set [w, 21w+5
26
]
according to the cumulative wage distribution.
F (w) =
4
3
− 1
3
s
16− 63(w − w)
(1− w) (7)
In equilibrium firms receive an expected payoﬀ of πi = 2127 and workers get a job with
probability 73/81 and each firm receives an expected payoﬀ of πi = 2127(1 − w). The
total number of matches is M = 73
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= 2.703. The lack of ex post competition makes the
expected number of matches less than the maximum.
A.3 Directed search with ex-post competition
A similar wage setting scheme has been studied before by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2006) who considered no recall and limited short lists. Short lists, however, do not allow
firms to go back to their candidates. Thus, firms that compete ex-post, but shortlist their
candidates will generally not achieve the maximum matching. Below, we derive the full
recall equilibrium.
First, we consider a candidate equilibrium where 2 firms (L) oﬀer a low and one (H)
oﬀers a high wage. This equilibrium does exist. In both cases we must calculate the
expected payoﬀs of the firms (both H and L) and the workers. Below, we derive the
distribution of possible networks, and the payoﬀs for the diﬀerent firms and the workers
for each network realization for the LLH case. In the second part, we show that an
equilibrium where one firms oﬀers a low wage and two firms a high wage does not exist.
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A.3.1 Two low and one high wage firm
Let H be the high wage firm and A and B the low wage firms, ξ is the probability that
a worker sends one of her applications to H. Finally, denote the payoﬀs of firm type
j ∈ {H,L} by πFj.
The first three columns of Table 3 below denote the number of applicants at each
firm (H,A or B). The fourth column gives the probability that the allocation occurs. The
remaining columns contain the profit of firms (H, A and B).
If the high wage firm has an applicant its payoﬀ is given by (1−wh), otherwise it is zero.
A low wage firm only has to increase its posted wage, if its candidate also received an oﬀer
from the high wage firm. This can only occur if firm (H) has 3 candidates (else the other
low wage firm has 3 candidates implying that the worker in question cannot also receive
an oﬀer from firm (H)). A low wage firm, e.g. firm (A), receives 0 if it has no candidates,
it receives (1 − w) if (H,A,B) 6= (3, 1, 2) and it receives (2/3)(1 − w) + (1/3)(1 − wh)
if (H,A,B) = (3, 1, 2). This last expression follows from the fact that with probability
1/3, its candidate receives an oﬀer from the high wage firm so firm (A) has to increase
its initial oﬀer in order to be able to employ the worker. Table 3 below summarizes the
expected payoﬀs of the firms.
H A B probability πFH πFL(A) πFL(B)
3 1 2 3
8
ξ3 1− wh 2
3
(1− w) + 1
3
¡
1− wh
¢
1− w
3 2 1 3
8
ξ3 1− wh 1− w 2
3
(1− w) + 1
3
¡
1− wh
¢
3 3 0 1
8
ξ3 1− wh 1− w 0
3 0 3 1
8
ξ3 1− wh 0 1− w
2 2 2 2
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1− wh 1− w 1− w
2 3 1 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1− wh 1− w 1− w
2 1 3 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1− wh 1− w 1− w
1 3 2 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1− wh 1− w 1− w
1 2 3 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1− wh 1− w 1− w
0 3 3 (1− ξ)3 0 1− w 1− w
Table 3: Network formation and firm payoﬀs with two low and one high-wage
firm
Next, we turn to the worker payoﬀs. First, consider the initial allocation after the
first two workers have applied (H2,A2,B2) = (2, 1, 1). These are shown in the first three
columns. The next column shows the probability that this allocation occurs. The next
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three columns (H,A,B) denote the final allocation and the eighth column shows the con-
ditional probability that this allocation occurs. The last column shows the payoﬀ of a
worker, who send one application to the high wage firm and one to the low wage firm.
This is the notation we use throughout the paper. Call the worker in question, worker
1. In case of (3, 2, 1), which is equivalent to (3, 1, 2) by replacing A by B, worker 1 is
with two other applicants at firm H and with one other applicant at a low-wage firm.
With probability 1/3, the worker’s application at the high-wage firm is selected and she
receives wh. With probability 2/3 she is not selected first at the high-wage firm. In that
case, worker 2 or 3 is alone and the high-wage firm could have selected the worker at firm
B with probability 1/2 (this firm will bid wh+ ε and gets the worker, the high-wage firm
can aﬀord not to bid further) and in that case the worker in question (1) is picked next
by the high-wage firm with probability 1/2 and receives wh. In all other cases worker 1
is matched at the low-wage firm for sure and receives w.
1
3
wh +
2
3
µ
1
2
1
2
wh +
3
4
w
¶
=
1
2
w +
1
2
wh
In case of an initial allocation (2, 2, 0) or (2, 0, 2), we have to distinguish between the
outcomes (3, 3, 0) and (3, 0, 3) on the one hand and (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) on the other
hand. Clearly, in case (3, 3, 0) or (3, 0, 3) worker one is picked with probability 1/3 by
the high-wage firm. If not, which occurs with probability 2/3, the worker is one of two
remaining workers at firm H, i.e., she is hired with probability 1/2 at wage w. In the
(3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) cases, the worker is oﬀered the wage wh with probability 1/3 by the
high-wage firm. With probability 2/3 she is not selected first at the high-wage firm. In
that case, worker 2 and 3 are at the other low-wage firm. Since this firm can be sure that
it will always hire, it will not increase its bid and the first worker will be hired by the
high-wage firm. Consequently, there is no chance for worker 1 to get his wage bid up if
she is not first at the high-wage firm.
In case of an initial allocation (1, 1, 2) or (1, 2, 1) we have to distinguish between the
final outcomes (2, 2, 2) on the one hand and (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) on the other hand. Consider
the (2, 2, 2) case. With probability 1/2, the worker receives an oﬀer from the high-wage
firm and receives wh. What happens if he does not receive the first oﬀer from the high-
wage firm? With probability 1/2, the other worker, who is at the high-wage firm, receives
an oﬀer at a low-wage firm. The low-wage firm will, however, not bid more, because it
knows it will always get a worker so this other worker will be hired by the high-wage firm
and we have,
1
2
wh +
1
2
w.
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Next consider the (2, 1, 3) case which is equivalent to the (2, 3, 1) case. Again, with
probability 1/2, the worker receives an oﬀer from the high-wage firm and receives wh.
The only low-wage firm that would be willing to compete is the firm with one worker.
But this worker cannot have applied to the high-wage firm because there is a low wage
firm with 3 candidates. So the payoﬀs are,
1
2
wh +
1
2
w.
Finally consider the (1, 3, 2) case which is equivalent to the (1, 2, 3) case. If there are
no other workers at the high-wage firm, the worker in question gets wh for sure. All of
the above is summarized in the following table.
H2 A2 B2 probability H A B probability πWH
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 3 2 1 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
3 1 2 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 3 3 0 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wh
3 2 1 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 3 1 2 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
3 0 3 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wh
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 2 2 2 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
2 1 3 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 2 3 1 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
2 2 2 1
2
1
2
wh + 1
2
w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 1 3 2 1
2
wh
1 2 3 1
2
wh
Table 4: Worker payoﬀs with two low and one high-wage firm for a worker
who one application to a low-wage firm and one to a high-wage firm
Next, we must consider the payoﬀ for a worker who sends both applications to the
low wage firms. This worker cannot receive more than w because she did not apply to a
high-wage firm and because the event that both low-wage firms have 1 candidate has a
zero probability. So we have,
This just implies that a worker who sends both applications to a low-wage firm receives
expected utility of
¡
1− (1− ξ)2
¢
w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
w.
Equilibrium In equilibrium all firms must make equal profits regardless of the wage
they post, i.e. πFH = πFL. Workers send their application such that they maximize their
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H2 A2 B2 probability H A B πWL
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 2 2 2 w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 2 3 1 w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 2 1 3 w
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 1 2 3 w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 1 3 2 w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 0 3 3 2
3
w
Table 5: Worker payoﬀs with two low and one high-wage firm for a worker
who sends both applications to low-wage firms
expected payoﬀ. Given that at most two diﬀerent wages, i.e. wh ≥ w, are oﬀered by three
firms. Workers are either indiﬀerent between sending one of their applications to the high-
wage firm and the other one to one of the low-wage firms (mixed strategy equilibrium),
i.e. πWH = πWL, or they strictly prefer to send one application to the high-wage firm
and send the second one to one of the low wage firms (pure strategy equilibrium), i.e.
πWH > πWL. Note, that sending both applications to both low-wage firms cannot be an
equilibrium, since it would violate the equal profit condition. Given the workers’ optimal
application strategy firms must have no incentive to deviate from the wages oﬀered in
equilibrium.
Using tables 4 and 5, the worker’s indiﬀerence condition can be written as
1
2
ξ2
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
wh +
1
2
w
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
wh +
1
2
w
¶¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
2
µ
1
3
wh +
1
3
w
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
3
wh +
2
3
w
¶¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
2
µ
1
3
wh +
2
3
w
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
3
wh +
1
3
w
¶¶
+ ξ (1− ξ) 1
2
2
µ
1
2
wh +
1
2
w
¶
+ξ (1− ξ)
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
wh +
1
2
w
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
wh +
1
2
w
¶¶
+ (1− ξ)2
µ
1
2
¡
wh
¢
+
1
2
¡
wh
¢¶
=
¡
1− (1− ξ)2
¢
w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
w,
which simplifies to
5
12
whξ2 + wξ − 1
2
wξ2 − whξ + wh = w
µ
−1
3
ξ2 +
2
3
ξ +
2
3
¶
µ
5
12
ξ2 − ξ + 1
¶
wh =
µ
1
6
ξ2 − 1
3
ξ +
2
3
¶
w.
wh
w
=
1
6
ξ2 − 1
3
ξ + 2
3
5
12
ξ2 − ξ + 1
. (8)
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Since wh ≥ w, an equilibrium can only exist for ξ ≥ 2/3. Totally diﬀerentiating equation
(8) with respect to wh and w gives
dξ
dwh
=
5
12
ξ2 − ξ + 1
w
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢
− wh
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢ (9)
dξ
dw
=
1
6
ξ2 − 1
3
ξ + 2
3
wh
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
− w
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢ . (10)
The equal profit condition implies πFH = πFA, i.e.
(1− wh)
¡
1− (1− ξ)3
¢
=
1
8
ξ3
¡
1− wh
¢
+
µ
1− 1
4
ξ3
¶
(1− w)
(1− wh) =
¡
1− 1
4
ξ3
¢
(1− w)¡
1− 1
8
ξ3 − (1− ξ)3
¢
(1− wh)
(1− w) =
¡
1− 1
4
ξ3
¢¡
1− 1
8
ξ3 − (1− ξ)3
¢ . (11)
Again, since wh ≥ w, an equilibrium can only exist for ξ ≥ 2/3.
A low wage firm has no incentive to oﬀer a diﬀerent wage, if
dπFL
dw
= −
µ
1− 1
4
ξ3
¶
+
3
8
ξ2
¡
1− wh
¢ dξ
dw
− 3
4
ξ2 (1− w) dξ
dw
= 0.
Use (10) to eliminate
dξ
dw
and eliminate wh by using (11) yields,¡
3
8
ξ2
¡
1− wh
¢
− 3
4
ξ2 (1− w)
¢ ¡
1
6
ξ2 − 1
3
ξ + 2
3
¢
wh
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
− w
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢ = µ1− 1
4
ξ3
¶
¡
1
6
ξ2 − 1
3
ξ + 2
3
¢¡
1− 1
4
ξ3
¢ Ã 38ξ2 ¡1− 14ξ3¢¡
1− 1
8
ξ3 − (1− ξ)3
¢ − 3
4
ξ2
!
(1− w)
=
µ
10
12
ξ − 1
¶
−
¡
1− 1
4
ξ3
¢ ¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢¡
1− 1
8
ξ3 − (1− ξ)3
¢ (1− w)− wµ2
6
ξ − 1
3
¶
w =
( 16 ξ
2− 1
3
ξ+2
3)
(1− 14 ξ
3)
µ
3
8
ξ2(1− 14 ξ
3)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
− 3
4
ξ2
¶
+
(1− 14 ξ
3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
−
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
( 16 ξ
2− 1
3
ξ+2
3)
(1− 14 ξ
3)
µ
3
8
ξ2(1− 14 ξ
3)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
− 3
4
ξ2
¶
+
(1− 14 ξ
3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
−
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢ . (12)
The high-wage firm firm has no incentive to oﬀer a diﬀerent wage, if
dπFH
dwh
= −
¡
1− (1− ξ)3
¢
+ 3 (1− ξ)2 (1− wh) dξ
dwh
= 0
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Replace
dξ
dwh
by the rhs of (9) and eliminate wh by using (11) yields,
¡
1− (1− ξ)3
¢
= 3 (1− ξ)2
(1− 14 ξ
3)(1−w)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
¡
5
12
ξ2 − ξ + 1
¢
w
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢
−
µ
1− (1−
1
4
ξ3)(1−w)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
¶¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
w =
3(1−ξ)2(1− 14 ξ
3)( 512 ξ
2−ξ+1)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)(1−(1−ξ)3)
− (1−
1
4
ξ3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
+
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
3(1−ξ)2(1− 14 ξ
3)( 512 ξ
2−ξ+1)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)(1−(1−ξ)3)
− (1−
1
4
ξ3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
+
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢ . (13)
The plot below, shows this equation (optimality condition for high wage firms) together
with the optimality condition for low wage firms (12). We see that there is a unique
feasible strictly positive (ξ, w) pair that satisfies both equilibrium conditions.
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The equilibrium (ξ, w) pair can be found by substituting the wage using equations (12) and
(13). This implies the following equation for the application probability to the high-wage
firm,
( 16 ξ
2− 1
3
ξ+ 2
3)
(1−14 ξ
3)
µ
3
8
ξ2(1− 14 ξ
3)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
− 3
4
ξ2
¶
+
(1−14 ξ
3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
−
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
( 16 ξ
2− 1
3
ξ+ 2
3)
(1−14 ξ
3)
µ
3
8
ξ2(1− 14 ξ
3)
(1−18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
− 3
4
ξ2
¶
+
(1−14 ξ
3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
−
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢
=
3(1−ξ)2(1− 14 ξ
3)( 512 ξ
2−ξ+1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)(1−(1−ξ)3)
− (1−
1
4
ξ3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
+
¡
10
12
ξ − 1
¢
3(1−ξ)2(1−14 ξ
3)( 512 ξ
2−ξ+1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)(1−(1−ξ)3)
− (1−
1
4
ξ3)( 1012 ξ−1)
(1− 18 ξ
3−(1−ξ)3)
+
¡
2
6
ξ − 1
3
¢
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¡
736ξ − 1008ξ2 + 432ξ3 + 80ξ4 − 48ξ5 − 54ξ6 + 21ξ7 − 192
¢¡
84ξ2 − 288ξ + 300ξ3 − 430ξ4 + 267ξ5 − 80ξ6 + 9ξ7 + 144
¢
=
¡
352ξ − 336ξ2 + 32ξ3 + 260ξ4 − 216ξ5 + 46ξ6 − 192
¢¡
1092ξ3 − 204ξ2 − 288ξ − 1330ξ4 + 798ξ5 − 243ξ6 + 30ξ7 + 144
¢
Solving yields ξ = 0.722, which implies that w = 0.252, and wh = 0.272. The expected
number of hirings is obtained by summing up the expected hiring probability of the high-
wage firm and both low-wage firms, i.e.,
M =
¡
1− (1− ξ)3
¢
+ 2
µ
1
8
ξ3 +
µ
1− 1
4
ξ3
¶¶
= 2.884
A.3.2 No equilibrium exists where two firms oﬀer a high wage or all firms
oﬀer the same wage
Firms’ payoﬀs We show that no equilibrium exists where 2 firms post w and one firm
wl ≤ w. In that case, the payoﬀs for the firms can be calculated as follows.18 First note
that in this case the high-wage firms receive zero, if they have no candidate, but if they
have at least one candidate they always receive 1−w, because they never have to compete
up to one since it cannot be that two firms have only one applicant.
Next, consider the payoﬀs for a low-wage firm. If it has 3 candidates, it will get 1−wl.
If (L,A,B) = (2, 2, 2), the low-wage firm has to pay w ≥ wl if both its workers receive an
oﬀer from both high-wage firms in the first round. The probability that this happens is
1/2× 1/2. Thus, the payoﬀ is
3
4
(1− wl) + 1
4
(1− w).
Next consider the (1, 3, 2) case, which is equivalent to the (1, 2, 3) case. Suppose
worker 1 applied to the low-wage firm. The low-wage firm has to Bertrand compete,
if worker 1 is first at the high-wage firm with 3 applications (probability 1/3) or else
(probability 2/3), if both high-wage firms oﬀer the job to the same worker (probability
1/2) in round 1 (the high-wage firm with only 2 applications will get the worker) and if
worker 1 gets an oﬀer from the high-wage firm with initially 3 applications in the second
round (probability 1/2) . Note that the low-wage firm will bid most aggressively, i.e. will
18An alternative proof that only rules out an equilibrium without wage dispersion is available upon
request.
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oﬀer w + ε, and will get the worker for sure. So its payoﬀ isµ
1
3
+
2
3
µ
1
2
1
2
¶¶
(1− w) + 1
2
¡
1− wl
¢
=
1
2
¡
1− wl
¢
+
1
2
(1− w) .
The Table below summarizes the expected payoﬀs of the firms.
L A B probability πFL πFH , A πFH , B
3 1 2 3
8
ξ3 1− wl 1− w 1− w
3 2 1 3
8
ξ3 1− wl 1− w 1− w
3 3 0 1
8
ξ3 1− wl 1− w 0
3 0 3 1
8
ξ3 1− wl 0 1− w
2 2 2 2
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 3
4
(1− wl) + 1
4
(1− w) 1− w 1− w
2 3 1 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1− wl 1− w 1− w
2 1 3 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1− wl 1− w 1− w
1 3 2 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1
2
(1− wl) + 1
2
(1− w) 1− w 1− w
1 2 3 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1
2
(1− wl) + 1
2
(1− w) 1− w 1− w
0 3 3 (1− ξ)3 0 1− w 1− w
Table 6: Network formation and firm payoﬀs with one low and two high-wage
firms
Workers’ payoﬀs First, consider the payoﬀ for the marginal worker when she sends one
of her applications to the low-wage firm. Consider the initial allocation after the first two
workers have applied (L2,A2,B2) = (2, 1, 1). Let us call the worker in question, worker 1.
In case of (3, 2, 1), which is equivalent to (3, 1, 2) by replacing A by B, worker 1 is with
two other applicants at firm L and with one other applicant at a high-wage firm. The
worker prefers now an oﬀer from a high-wage firm. With probability 1/2 she gets the job
oﬀer at the high-wage in the first round. With probability 1/2 she is not selected first at
the high-wage firm. In this case the other worker, who also sends her second application
to the low-wage firm, prefers an oﬀer by the high-wage firm. Thus, the other worker will
accept the first oﬀer by the high-wage firm. Subsequently, worker 1 will only receive wl.
Therefore, her expected payoﬀs are, 1
2
w + 1
2
wl.
In case of an initial allocation (2, 2, 0) or (2, 0, 2), we must distinguish between the
outcomes (3, 3, 0) and (3, 0, 3) on the one side and (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) on the other side.
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Clearly, in case (3, 3, 0) or (3, 0, 3) worker one is picked with probability 1/3 by the high-
wage firm. If not, which occurs with probability 2/3, then the worker is one of two
remaining workers at a the low-wage firm, i.e. she his hired with probability 1/2 at the
wage wl. In case of (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) the worker is the only applicant at the high-wage
firm. She therefore receives the wage w for sure.
In case of an initial allocation (1, 1, 2) or (1, 2, 1) we have to distinguish between the
final outcomes (2, 2, 2) on the one hand and (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) on the other hand. Consider
the (2, 2, 2) case. Worker 1 gets the higher wage w, if the high-wage firm oﬀers her the
job. With probability 1/2 worker 1 is chosen first by the high-wage firm. If worker 1 is
not chosen in the first round (which happens with probability 1/2), then with probability
1/2 both high-wage firms will compete for the same worker. The high-wage firm, where
worker 1 applied, remains vacant with probability 1/2. In this case the high-wage firm
oﬀer worker 1 the wage w in the second round. Thus, worker 1 gets the payoﬀ
1
2
w +
1
2
µ
1
2
1
2
w +
3
4
wl
¶
=
5
8
w +
3
8
wl.
Next consider the (2, 1, 3) case. If worker 1 applied to the low-wage firm she is at firm
B with probability 1 and selected with probability 1/3. If she is not selected (probability
2/3), the worker who is alone at firm A is selected by firm B (probability 1/2) and hired
by firm A with probability 1 (firm A will bid most aggressively). In that case worker 1
will be hired by firm B with probability 1/2. Else she will be hired by the low-wage firm.
So she receives in expectation,
1
3
w +
2
3
µ
1
2
1
2
w +
3
4
wl
¶
=
1
2
w +
1
2
wl.
Finally, consider the (1, 3, 2) cases. Worker 1, who applied to firm L must have also
applied to firm A, because A got 3 applications. Worker 1 gets hired at the high-wage
firm A with probability 1/3, or (probability (2/3) if firm A and B oﬀer the job to the same
worker (probability 1/2) then firm B hires this worker (firm B will bid more aggressively),
and worker 1 then gets an oﬀer at the firm with 3 applicants (A) with probability 1/2
(the low-wage firm will bid more aggressive and hire the worker so he ends up there at
wage w). Else he gets wl. So his expected payoﬀs are,
1
3
w +
2
3
µ
1
2
1
2
w +
3
4
wl
¶
=
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
The following table summarizes all of the above.
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L2 A2 B2 probability L A B probability πWL
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 3 2 1 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
3 1 2 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 3 3 0 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wl
3 2 1 1
2
w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 3 1 2 1
2
w
3 0 3 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wl
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 2 2 2 1
2
5
8
w + 3
8
wl
2 1 3 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 2 3 1 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
2 2 2 1
2
5
8
w + 3
8
wl
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 1 3 2 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
1 2 3 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
Table 7: Worker payoﬀs with one low and two high-wage firms
Finally, a worker who sends both applications to high-wage firms will be hired with
probability 2/3 in the (0, 3, 3) case. Else this worker will be hired for sure and receives
w. The Table below gives the payoﬀ to a worker who sends both applications to the
high-wage firms.
L2 A2 B2 probability L A B πWH
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 2 2 2 w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 2 3 1 w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 2 1 3 w
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 1 2 3 w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 1 3 2 w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 0 3 3 2
3
w
Table 8: Worker payoﬀs with one low and two high-wage firms for a worker
who sends both applications to high-wage firms
Equilibrium In equilibrium all firms must make equal profits regardless of the wage
they post, i.e. πFL = πFA = πFB. Workers send their application such that they maximize
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their expected payoﬀ, given that at most two diﬀerent wages, i.e., wl < w, are oﬀered by
three firms. Workers are indiﬀerent between sending one of their applications to the low-
wage firm and the other one to one of the high-wage firms (mixed strategy equilibrium),
if πWL = πWH .
Using the payoﬀ tables, the indiﬀerence condition can be written as,
1
2
ξ2
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
2
µ
1
3
w +
1
3
wl
¶
+
1
2
w
¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
µ
1
3
w +
1
3
wl
¶¶
+ ξ (1− ξ)
µ
1
2
µ
5
8
w +
3
8
wl
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶¶
+ξ (1− ξ)
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶
+
1
2
µ
5
8
w +
3
8
wl
¶¶
+(1− ξ)2
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶¶
=
¡
1− (1− ξ)2
¢
w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
w.
Simplifying yields,
1
2
w − 1
24
wlξ2 +
1
8
wξ − 1
24
wξ2 − 1
8
wlξ +
1
2
wl =
¡
1− (1− ξ)2
¢
w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
wµ
− 1
24
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ +
1
2
¶
wl =
µ
− 7
24
ξ2 +
13
24
ξ +
1
6
¶
w.
wl
w
=
− 7
24
ξ2 + 13
24
ξ + 1
6
− 1
24
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ + 1
2
(14)
Since wl < w, an equilibrium can only exist for ξ < 2/3. Totally diﬀerentiating equation
(14) with respect to wl and w gives
dξ
dwl
=
− 1
24
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ + 1
2
w
¡
−14
24
ξ + 13
24
¢
− wl
¡
− 2
24
ξ − 1
8
¢ (15)
dξ
dw
=
− 7
24
ξ2 + 13
24
ξ + 1
6
wl
¡
− 2
24
ξ − 1
8
¢
− w
¡
−14
24
ξ + 13
24
¢ . (16)
Given the workers’ optimal application strategy firms must have no incentive to deviate
from the wages oﬀered in equilibrium. Using the payoﬀ tables, the firm payoﬀs can be
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written as,
πFL =
µ
ξ3 +
3
2
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 9
8
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3
2
ξ (1− ξ)2
¶
(1− wl)
+
µ
3
8
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3
2
ξ (1− ξ)2
¶
(1− w)
=
µ
3
2
ξ − 3
8
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ3
¶
(1− wl) +
µ
3
2
ξ − 21
8
ξ2 +
9
8
ξ3
¶
(1− w)
πFH =
µ
7
8
ξ3 + 3ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3ξ (1− ξ)2 + (1− ξ)3
¶
(1− w)
=
µ
1− 1
8
ξ3
¶
(1− w)
The equal profit condition implies πFL = πFH i.e.µ
3
2
ξ − 3
8
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ3
¶
(1− wl) =
µ
1− 3
2
ξ +
21
8
ξ2 − 5
4
ξ3
¶
(1− w)
(1− wl) =
¡
1− 3
2
ξ + 21
8
ξ2 − 5
4
ξ3
¢¡
3
2
ξ − 3
8
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ3
¢ (1− w)
(1− wl)
(1− w) =
¡
7
8
ξ3 + 21
8
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3
2
ξ (1− ξ)2 + (1− ξ)3
¢¡
ξ3 + 3
2
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 9
8
ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3
2
ξ (1− ξ)2
¢
High-wage firms have no incentive to oﬀer a diﬀerent wage, if
dπFA
dw
= −
µ
1− 1
8
ξ3
¶
− 3
8
ξ2
dξ
dw
= 0
Use (16) to eliminate
dξ
dw
gives,
−
3
8
ξ2
¡
− 7
24
ξ2 + 13
24
ξ + 1
6
¢
wl
¡
− 2
24
ξ − 1
8
¢
− w
¡
−14
24
ξ + 13
24
¢ = µ1− 1
8
ξ3
¶
Use (14) to eliminate wl, yields,
w =
(1−32 ξ+
21
8
ξ2− 5
4
ξ3)(− 224 ξ−
1
8)
( 32 ξ−
3
8
ξ2− 1
8
ξ3)
−
3
8
ξ2(− 724 ξ
2+ 13
24
ξ+1
6)
(1− 18 ξ
3)
−
¡
− 2
24
ξ − 1
8
¢
(1−32 ξ+
21
8
ξ2− 5
4
ξ3)(− 224 ξ−
1
8)
( 32 ξ−
3
8
ξ2− 1
8
ξ3)
−
¡
−14
24
ξ + 13
24
¢ (17)
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The low-wage firm firm has no incentive to oﬀer a diﬀerent wage, if
dπFL
dwl
= −
µ
3
2
ξ − 3
8
ξ2 − 1
8
ξ3
¶
+
µµ
3
2
− 3
4
ξ − 3
8
ξ2
¶
(1− wl) +
µ
3
2
− 21
4
ξ +
27
8
ξ2
¶
(1− w)
¶
dξ
dwl
= 0
Use(15) to eliminate the
dξ
dwl
term and (14) to eliminate wl, yields,
w =
( 32−
3
4
ξ− 3
8
ξ2)(1−32 ξ+
21
8
ξ2− 5
4
ξ3)
( 32 ξ−
3
8
ξ2− 1
8
ξ3)
+
¡
3
2
− 21
4
ξ + 27
8
ξ2
¢
+
(( 32 ξ−
3
8
ξ2−1
8
ξ3)−(1−32 ξ+
21
8
ξ2− 5
4
ξ3))(− 224 ξ−
1
8)
(− 124 ξ
2− 1
8
ξ+1
2)
( 32−
3
4
ξ− 3
8
ξ2)(1− 32 ξ+
21
8
ξ2− 5
4
ξ3)
( 32 ξ−
3
8
ξ2−1
8
ξ3)
+
¡
3
2
− 21
4
ξ + 27
8
ξ2
¢
+
(− 1424 ξ+
13
24)(
3
2
ξ− 3
8
ξ2− 1
8
ξ3)
(− 124 ξ
2− 1
8
ξ+1
2)
The Figure below plots this equation (black) together with equation (17) (red) and shows
that there exists no equilibrium wage that satisfies ξ < 2/3. Thus, an equilibrium with
one low and two high wage firms cannot exist.
10.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
xi
w
A.4 Wage posting with commitment
This case has been studied before by Kircher (2009) and for the no-recall case by Galeanos
and Kircher (2010). Assume that firms ex ante commit to paying a wage and that they do
not (or cannot) engage in ex post Bertrand competition, even, if it is profitable to do so
after observing the number of applicants. Workers have a desire to diversify their appli-
cation portfolios and they choose them according to a marginal improvement algorithm,
see Chade and Smith (2006). The first application is sent to a location that generates
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the highest expected payoﬀ, the second one to the location that gives the greatest mar-
ginal improvement given the first one, etcetera. Firms respond to the worker’s desire to
diversify by oﬀering diﬀerent wages. Suppose two firms (A and B) post a wage w and
the third firm posts wj. Since firms commit to their wage, they always earn one minus
the wage posted, if they are matched. Workers observe the posted wages and send their
applications in order to maximize their utility. Let ξ be the probability that a worker
sends one application to the single firm that oﬀers a diﬀerent wage. If the wage of this
firm is lower, we call this firm L and if it is higher, we call it H. The parameter ξ depends
on wj and w through an indiﬀerence condition, which we develop below. We focus again
on the case where workers send two applications.
A.4.1 Existence of an equilibrium with two low and one high-wage firm
First, we determine the profit of the high and the low wage firms. In equilibrium all
firms must make (i) equal profits and (ii) have no incentive to deviate. In the next step,
we determine the workers’ payoﬀs. At the equilibrium application probability ξ, workers
must be indiﬀerent between applying to the high and to the low wage firms. In Galeanos
and Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009) the application probability to one set of firms is
always one, implying that the workers’ indiﬀerence condition need not hold with equality.
In addition Galeanos and Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009) allow for firm entry. This
ensures that the profits of both types of firms are driven down to zero, i.e., the equal profit
condition holds with equality and allows firms to post the wages that maximize workers’
utility. The 3 by 3 example considered here does not allow for firm entry. This implies
that workers will use a mixed application strategy, i.e., ξ 6= 1.
Firm payoﬀs The firm that oﬀers the high wage, i.e., wh > w, is always matched
conditional on receiving at least one application.
If all firms receive 2 applications, i.e., in case of (2, 2, 2), unlike the case with Bertrand
competition, a low-wage firm will not hire with certainty because it can lose both its
candidates to one of the other firms. The worker who is selected first by the low-wage
firm also applied to the high wage firm with probability 1/2 and the worker will go to the
high-wage firm if she is first there (which occurs with probability 1/2). The low-wage firm
in question will not hire in that case, if its second applicant that must have applied to
the other low-wage firm is first at the other low-wage firm (probability 1/2) and accepts
that oﬀer (probability 1/2). Alternatively, the same worker could be first at both low-
wage firms (with probability 1/2× 1/2). If the worker accepts at the other low-wage firm
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(probability 1/2), the low-wage firm remains unmatched, if the second worker is first at
the high-wage firm (probability 1/2).
1−
µ
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
¶
=
7
8
.
If a low-wage firm has one applicant then it is always competing with the firm with 3
applicants. If the high-wage firm has 3 applicants, as in the (3, 1, 2) case, then the low-
wage firm remains unmatched, if the worker is first at the high-wage firm (probability
1/3), since wh > w. Thus, the matching probability of a low-wage firm firm is 2/3. If
the other low-wage firm has 3 applications, then the low-wage firm remains unmatched,
if the worker is first at the other low-wage firm (probability 1/3) and accepts the oﬀer
(probability 1/2). Thus, the hiring probability of the low-wage firm is 5/6.
Table 9 summarizes the expected matching probabilities for each realized network for
the high-wage firm and both low-wage firms and the likelihood of occurrence.
H A B probability πFH πFL (A) πFL (B)
3 1 2 3
8
ξ3 1 2
3
1
3 2 1 3
8
ξ3 1 1 2
3
3 3 0 1
8
ξ3 1 1 0
3 0 3 1
8
ξ3 1 0 1
2 2 2 2
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1 7
8
7
8
2 3 1 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1 1 5
6
2 1 3 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1 5
6
1
1 3 2 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1 1 1
1 2 3 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 1 1 1
0 3 3 (1− ξ)3 0 1 1
Table 9: Firm matching probabilities with one highe- and two low-wage firms
The respective profits of the high- and the low-wage firms are given by
πFH =
¡
1− wh
¢ ¡
ξ3 + 3ξ2 (1− ξ) + 3ξ (1− ξ)2
¢
=
¡
1− wh
¢ ¡
3ξ − 3ξ2 + ξ3
¢
(18)
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πFL = (1− w)
µ
3
8
ξ3
2
3
+
1
2
ξ3 +
2
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 7
8
+
1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ)
µ
1 +
5
6
¶¶
+(1− w)
¡
3ξ (1− ξ)2 + (1− ξ)3
¢
= (1− w)
µ
1
16
ξ3 − 5
16
ξ2 + 1
¶
. (19)
The equal profit condition implies,¡
1− wh
¢
(1− w) =
1
16
ξ3 − 5
16
ξ2 + 1
3ξ − 3ξ2 + ξ3
(20)
The equal profit condition also requires 1−w
h
1−w < 1 or
1
16
ξ3 − 5
16
ξ2 + 1 < 3ξ − 3ξ2 + ξ3
This is satisfied for ξ > 0.558. Thus, at this stage we cannot rule out a pure- (application)
strategy equilibrium for workers, i.e. ξ = 1. In this case the indiﬀerence condition for
workers need not hold with equality. The only requirement is that sending an application
to the high wage firm and one to a low-wage firm gives at least the same payoﬀ as sending
both applications to the low wage firms. There could, however, also be a mixed strategy
equilibrium. In this case workers need to be indiﬀerent between the two strategies. In
any equilibrium, it must be the case that firms have no incentive to deviate.
Worker payoﬀs Table 10 shows in columns 1 to 3 the possible networks that can arise.
Suppose that worker 1 sends one application to the high-wage firm and one application
to either firm A or B. The resulting network is then given by columns 5 to 7.
In the (2, 1, 1) network, worker 1 is with two other applicants at firm H and with one
other applicant at a low-wage firm. Since the other applicant also applied to firm H,
worker 1 is always matched. With probability 1/3, the high-wage firm oﬀers the worker
the job (at wh > w), which he accepts. Otherwise worker 1 is hired at the low-wage firm
at w.
In the (2, 2, 0) or (2, 0, 2) case, we must distinguish between the outcomes (3, 3, 0) and
(3, 0, 3) on the one hand and (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) on the other hand. Clearly, in the
(3, 3, 0) or (3, 0, 3) cases, worker 1 is picked with probability 1/3 by the high-wage firm. If
not, which occurs with probability 2/3, then the worker is one of two remaining workers
at the low-wage firm, i.e. she is hired with probability 1/2. In case of (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2)
the worker is oﬀered a wage w by the low-wage firm with certainty. Thus, the worker
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accept the wage oﬀer wh at the high-wage firm if she is the first one chosen (probability
1/3), otherwise (probability 2/3) she accepts wage w at the low-wage firm.
In the (1, 1, 2) or (1, 2, 1) cases we must distinguish between the final outcomes (2, 2, 2)
on the one hand and (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) on the other hand. If the final network is given
by (2, 2, 2), worker 1 either gets an oﬀer from the high-wage firm with probability 1/2 and
she will accept this oﬀer. If worker 1 is second at the high-wage firm, there is no chance
that worker 1 still gets an oﬀer from that high-wage firm, since the first worker will accept
for sure. However, there is a chance that worker 1 gets an oﬀer from the low-wage firm.
Worker 1 gets an oﬀer from the low-wage firm, if she is first (probability 1/2), or if the first
worker at the low-wage firm does not accept the oﬀer from that low-wage firm. Note first
that it is impossible that the first worker at the low-wage firm applied to the high-wage
firm, since this would imply that both worker 1 and the first worker would have applied
to the same firms. However, the outcome (2, 2, 2) would then imply that the third worker
sent both applications to the same firm. This cannot be true. Thus, the first worker at
the low-wage does not accept the oﬀer, if he receives an oﬀer from the other low-wage firm
(which happens with probability 1/2 and she accepts with probability 1/2). Her expected
payoﬀ in that case is therefore,
1
2
wh +
1
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
1
2
¶
w =
1
2
wh +
5
16
w
If the final network is given by (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) the worker receives with probability 1/2
an oﬀer from the high-wage firm firm and accepts it. Note, that if worker 1 is second at
the high-wage firm, worker 1 has only one competing worker at the low-wage firm with 3
candidates. Worker 1 gets the job at the low-wage firm, if she is chosen first (probability
1/2) or if she is second and the first worker accepts an oﬀer at the other low-wage firm
(probability 1/2)
1
2
wh +
1
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
¶
w =
1
2
wh +
3
8
w
Finally, in the (0, 2, 2) case, worker 1 will be the only candidate at the high-wage firm H
and receive the wage wh with certainty.
Table 11 presents the worker’s payoﬀs, if she sends both applications to the low wage
firms. If the final network is given by (2, 2, 2), worker 1 gets at least one oﬀer from a
low-wage firm, because one of the workers that applied to the high-wage firm will accept
the high-wage firm’s oﬀer (since wh > w) and thus, worker 1 will be the only remaining
applicant at the low-wage firm where the worker that got a job at the high-wage firm
sent his second application to. In case of (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3), worker 1 is the only worker
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H2 A2 B2 probability H A B probability πWH
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 3 2 1 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
3 1 2 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 3 3 0 1
2
1
3
wh + 1
3
w
3 2 1 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 3 1 2 1
2
1
3
wh + 2
3
w
3 0 3 1
2
1
3
wh + 1
3
w
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 2 2 2 1
2
1
2
wh + 5
16
w
2 1 3 1
2
1
2
wh + 3
8
w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 2 3 1 1
2
1
2
wh + 3
8
w
2 2 2 1
2
1
2
wh + 5
16
w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 1 3 2 1
2
wh
1 2 3 1
2
wh
Table 10: Worker payoﬀs in the directed search with commitment case for a
worker who sends one application to a high and one to a low-wage firm
at firm A (or B) and will therefore get an wage oﬀer w for sure. In case of (1, 2, 3) or
(1, 3, 2) worker 1 also gets an oﬀer from a low-wage firm with certainty, since the workers
that applied to the high-wage firm will accept the high-wage firm’s oﬀer (since wh > w)
and thus, there are two applicants at two low-wage firms which are both matched with
certainty. Only in the (0, 3, 3) case, worker 1 can fail to match (with probability 1/3),
because 3 equal workers are competing for 2 jobs.
Payoﬀ for a worker who sends both applications to the low-wage firms, i.e.,
H2 A2 B2 probability H A B πWH
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 2 2 2 w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 2 3 1 w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 2 1 3 w
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 1 2 3 w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 1 3 2 w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 0 3 3 2
3
w
Table 11: Worker payoﬀs in the directed search with commitment case if the
marginal worker sends both applications to low-wage firms
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Equilibrium wages and application probabilities In equilibrium, all firms must
make again equal profits regardless of the wage they post, i.e. πFH = πFL. Workers send
their applications such that they maximize their expected payoﬀ given that at most two
diﬀerent wages are oﬀered by three firms. Workers are either indiﬀerent between sending
one of their applications to the high-wage firm and the other one to one of the low-wage
firms (mixed strategy equilibrium), i.e. πWH = πWL, or they strictly prefer to send one
application to the high-wage firm and send the second one to one of the low-wage firms
(pure strategy equilibrium), i.e. πWH > πWL. Note, that sending both applications to
both low-wage firms with certainty cannot be an equilibrium, since it would violate the
equal profit condition. Given the workers’ optimal application strategy firms must have
no incentive to deviate from the wages oﬀered in equilibrium.
Case 1: Mixed strategy equilibrium
If the high-wage firm oﬀers a higher wage, i.e. wh > w, the workers’ indiﬀerence
condition requires
1
2
ξ2
µ
1
3
wh +
2
3
w
¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
3
wh +
1
3
w
¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
3
wh +
2
3
w
¶
+ ξ (1− ξ)
µ
1
2
wh +
5
16
w
¶
+ξ (1− ξ)
µ
1
2
wh +
3
8
w
¶
+ (1− ξ)2wh
= ξ2w + 2ξ (1− ξ)w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
w
Simplifying gives
11
16
wξ + wh − ξwh − 5
48
wξ2 +
1
3
ξ2wh =
2
3
w +
2
3
wξ − 1
3
wξ2
wh − ξwh + 1
3
ξ2wh =
2
3
w − 1
48
wξ − 11
48
wξ2
wh
w
=
2
3
− 1
48
ξ − 11
48
ξ2
1− ξ + 1
3
ξ2
(21)
Given that wh > w, there exists an application probability ξ > 0.46423 such that workers
are indiﬀerent between applying to the high-wage firm and a low-wage firm.
Applying the implicit-function theorem to the workers’ indiﬀerence condition gives a
relation between the expected number of applications and the oﬀered wages.
dξ
dwh
¯¯¯¯
wh>w
=
1− ξ + 1
3
ξ2¡
− 1
48
− 22
48
ξ
¢
w −
¡
−1 + 2
3
ξ
¢
wh
(22)
dξ
dw
¯¯¯¯
wh>w
=
2
3
− 1
48
ξ − 11
48
ξ2¡
−1 + 2
3
ξ
¢
wh −
¡
− 1
48
− 22
48
ξ
¢
w
(23)
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Firms choose the wage that maximizes profits,
∂πFH
∂wh
= −
¡
3ξ − 3ξ2 + ξ3
¢
+
¡
1− wh
¢ ¡
3− 6ξ − 3ξ2
¢ dξ
dwh
¯¯¯¯
wh>w
= 0 (24)
∂πFL
∂w
= −
µ
1
16
ξ3 − 5
16
ξ2 + 1
¶
− (1− w)
µ
3
16
ξ2 − 10
16
ξ
¶
dξ
dw
¯¯¯¯
wh>w
= 0 (25)
Rewriting the firm’s equal profit condition, (20) yields,
wh = 1−
¡
1
16
ξ3 − 5
16
ξ2 + 1
¢¡
3ξ − 3ξ2 + ξ3
¢ (1− w)
Using (22) to eliminate dξ
dwh
in (24) and use the equation above to eliminate wh in (24)
gives,
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Using (23) to eliminate dξ
dw
in (25) gives,
−
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Solving for w yields,
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The equilibrium application probability follows from equating (26) and (27),
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!
The equilibrium application probability is ξ = 0.956. Substituting this into (26) or (27)
gives w = 0.772. The equal profit condition then implies wh = 0.825.
Case 2: Non existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e. ξ = 1
The equal profit condition with ξ = 1 requires
1− wh
1− w =
1
16
− 5
16
+ 1
3− 3 + 1 =
3
4
or wh =
1
4
+
3
4
w or w =
4
3
wh − 1
3
Using the first order condition of the high-wage firm and using (22) to eliminate dξ
dwh
implies at ξ = 1,
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Doing the same for the first order condition for the low-wage firms and using (23) to
illuminate dξ
dw
implies at ξ = 1,
∂πFA
∂w
¯¯¯¯
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Comparing the first order condition for the high-wage firm and the low-wage firm implies
that there exists no equilibrium wage w that ensures that no firm has an incentive to
deviate.
A.4.2 Non existence of an equilibrium with two high and one low-wage firm
In order to calculate the hiring probabilities, note that in the (2, 2, 2) case the low-wage
firm remains unmatched, if it competes with one of the high wage firms (A or B) in round
one for the same worker, which occurs with probability 1/2 × 1/2 (the probability that
the worker is first oﬀered the job at both firms). In the second round firm L oﬀers the job
to the remaining worker. If this worker was oﬀered the job at firm B (or A) in round one,
which happens with probability 1/2, then the worker will turn down the low-wage firm’s
oﬀer in round two, since wl < w. So the hiring probability in this case is 1− 1
2
1
2
1
2
= 7
8
.
Next, note that if the low-wage firm received only one application, then it is not
matched, if its worker receives the first oﬀer from the firm with 3 applications, which
happens with probability 1/3. If not, which occurs with probability 2/3, the firm with
three applicants will oﬀer the job to the same worker as the firm with 2 applicants with
probability 1/2 (suppose worker 1 is at the low-wage firm, then worker 2 and 3 applied at
firm A and B. Conditional on not picking worker 1, the probability that firms A and B
pick the same worker is 1/2 = 2× 1/2× 1/2). Since firms A and B oﬀer the same wage,
the firm with 3 applications will not get the first worker with probability 1/2. In this
case, the firm with 3 applications oﬀers in the second round with probability 1/2 the job
to the same worker that applied at firm L. Since wl < w, the low-wage firm will not be
matched. So in this case, the hiring probability is, 1−
¡
1
3
+ 2
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
¢
= 7
12
. Table 12 below
summarizes the matching probabilities and payoﬀs for the low-wage firm L.
Now consider the matching probability of the high-wage firms. If they have 3 applica-
tions, they are matched with certainty. If they got 2 applications, they also match with
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certainty, since they pay a higher wage than the low-wage firm. A high-wage firm with
2 applications also matches with certainty, if the other high-wage firm has 3 applicants,
since none of the two common applicants can be hired by the low-wage firm given that
wl < w. The same argument applies if all three firms have two applicants. If a high-
wage firm has one applicant and the low-wage firm 3 applicants, then the high-wage firm
also hires with certainty since wl < w. If one high-wage firm has one application and
the other has 3 applications, then the high-wage firm with 1 application does not get
matched with certainty. This happens if the same worker is first at the high-wage firm
with 3 applications (which happens with probability 1/3) and accepts the oﬀer of the firm
with 3 applicants (which happens with probability 1/2). The matching probabilities are
summarized in Table 12.
L A B probabilities πFL πFH (A) πFH (B)
3 1 2 3
8
ξ3 1 1 1
3 2 1 3
8
ξ3 1 1 1
3 3 0 1
8
ξ3 1 1 0
3 0 3 1
8
ξ3 1 0 1
2 2 2 2
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 7
8
1 1
2 3 1 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1 1 5
6
2 1 3 1
4
3ξ2 (1− ξ) 1 5
6
1
1 3 2 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 7
12
1 1
1 2 3 1
2
3ξ (1− ξ)2 7
12
1 1
0 3 3 (1− ξ)3 0 1 1
Table 12: Firms’ matching probabilities with two high- and one low-wage firm
The respective profits of the low- and high-wage firms follow from this table are given
by
πFL =
¡
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¡
1− wl
¢
(1− w) =
1− 1
8
ξ2
7
4
ξ − 11
16
ξ2 − 1
16
ξ3
Since 1−w
l
1−w > 1, by assumption w
l < w, it follows that only an equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists, since applying to the high-wage firmwith certainty, i.e. ξ = 1, contradicts
1−wl
1−w > 1. In a mixed strategy equilibrium workers have to be indiﬀerent between sending
both applications to low-wage firms and sending one application to a high-wage firm and
one to the low-wage firm. The equal profit condition implies that any ξ < 0.789 can be
an equilibrium solution.
The first order conditions for the high and the low-wage firms that determine the
wages at which firms have no incentive to deviate are given by
∂πFL
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= −
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4
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¯¯¯¯
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Worker payoﬀs Table 11 shows in columns 1 to 3, the possible networks that can arise.
Suppose that worker 1 sends one application to the low-wage firm and one application to
one of the high-wage firms (A or to B). The resulting network is then given by columns
5 to 7.
In the (2, 1, 1) case, worker 1 is with two other applicants at the low-wage firm and
with one other applicant at a high-wage firm. Since the other applicant at the high-wage
firm also applied to the low-wage firm, worker 1 is always matched. With probability 1/2,
the high-wage firm oﬀers the worker a wage w > wl, which he accepts. Otherwise worker
one is hired at the low-wage firm firm at wl.
In the (2, 2, 0) or (2, 0, 2) case we have to distinguish between the outcomes (3, 3, 0)
and (3, 0, 3) on the one hand and (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) on the other hand. Clearly, in case
(3, 3, 0) or (3, 0, 3) worker one is picked with probability 1/3 by a high-wage firm. If not,
which occurs with probability 2/3, then the worker is one of two remaining workers at
the low wage, i.e., she is hired with probability 1/2. In case of (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2) the
worker is oﬀered the wage w by the high-wage firm with certainty.
In the (1, 1, 2) or (1, 2, 1) cases we have to distinguish between the final outcomes
(2, 2, 2) on the one hand and (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) on the other hand. If the final network is
given by (2, 2, 2) , worker 1 receives with probability 1/2 an oﬀer from the high-wage firm
that she accepts. If worker 1 is second at the high-wage firm, there is a chance that she
still gets an oﬀer from the high-wage firm. Namely, if the first worker at the high-wage
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firm is also the first worker at the other high-wage firm (which happens with probability
1/2) and if this worker accepts the oﬀer at the other high-wage firm (which happens with
probability 1/2). Thus, the probability that worker 1 gets an oﬀer from the high-wage
firm is given by 1
2
+ 1
2
1
2
1
2
.
Next, we calculate the probability that worker 1 gets and accepts an oﬀer from the
low-wage firm. She gets an oﬀer, if she is first (probability 1/2), or (probability 1/2) if
the first worker at the low wage firm does not accept the oﬀer from the low-wage firm,
which happens only, if this worker is oﬀered a job at a high-wage firm (which happens
with probability 1/2 + (1/2× 1/2× 1/2) as calculated above). Since wl < w, worker 1
only accepts the oﬀer from the low-wage firm, if she does not get an oﬀer from a high-wage
firm (which happens with probability 1− (1/2 + 1/2× 1/2× 1/2))
1
2
w +
1
2
1
2
1
2
w +
µ
1−
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
1
2
¶¶µ
1
2
+
1
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
1
2
¶¶
wl =
5
8
w +
39
128
wl
If the final network is given by (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3) the worker receives with probability 1/3
an oﬀer from a high-wage firm and accepts it. If worker 1 is not first at a high-wage firm,
there is a chance that the worker still gets an oﬀer from this high-wage firm. Namely,
if the high-wage firm with three applications picks first the worker that also applied to
the other high-wage firm (which happens with probability 1/3). In this case the selected
worker will reject the oﬀer at the high-wage firm with 3 applications with probability 1/2.
If (in this case) the high-wage firm with 3 applications picks in the second round worker
1 (which happens with probability 1/2), then worker 1 will receive wage w. Thus, the
probability that worker 1 is oﬀered a wage by a high-wage firm is given by 1
3
+ 1
3
1
2
1
2
.
Next, we calculate the probability that worker 1 receives an oﬀer from the low-wage
firm. She gets an oﬀer, if she is first (probability 1/2), or if the first worker at the
low-wage firm does not accept the oﬀer from the low-wage firm, which happens only, if
the this worker is oﬀered a job at the high-wage firm (which happens with probability
1/3+1/3× 1/2× 1/2 as calculated above). Since wl < w, worker 1 only accepts the oﬀer
from the low-wage firm, if she does not get an oﬀer from a high-wage firm (which happens
with probability 1− (1/3 + 1/3× 1/2× 1/2)). Adding up yields,
1
3
w +
1
3
1
2
1
2
w +
µ
1−
µ
1
3
+
1
3
1
2
1
2
¶¶µ
1
2
+
1
2
µ
1
3
+
1
3
1
2
1
2
¶¶
wl =
5
12
w +
119
288
wl
Finally, in the (0, 2, 2) case, worker 1 will be one out of three applicants at the high-
wage firm and the only applicant at the low-wage firm. The payoﬀ is therefore (1/3)w
and (2/3)wl. Table 13 summarizes the worker’s payoﬀs,
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L2 A2 B2 probability L A B probability πWL
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 3 2 1 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
3 1 2 1
2
1
2
w + 1
2
wl
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 3 3 0 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wl
3 2 1 1
2
w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 3 1 2 1
2
w
3 0 3 1
2
1
3
w + 1
3
wl
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 2 2 2 1
2
5
8
w + 39
128
wl
2 1 3 1
2
5
12
w + 119
288
wl
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 2 3 1 1
2
5
12
w + 119
288
wl
2 2 2 1
2
5
8
w + 39
128
wl
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 1 3 2 1
2
1
3
w + 2
3
wl
1 2 3 1
2
1
3
w + 2
3
wl
Table 13: Worker payoﬀs with two high and one low-wage firm for a worker
who send one application to the low and one to a high wage firm
Table 14 presents the worker’s payoﬀs, if she sends both applications to the high-wage
firms.
If the final network is given by (2, 2, 2) the worker gets no oﬀer from any high-wage
firm, if she is second at both firms (which happens with probability 1/2× 1/2). In case
of (2, 3, 1) or (2, 1, 3), worker 1 is the only worker at the high-wage firm A (or B) and will
therefore get a wage oﬀer w for sure. In case of (1, 2, 3) or (1, 3, 2) worker 1 is first at the
high-wage firm with 3 applications with probability 1/3 and gets an oﬀer. If worker 1 is
second (probability 1/3), she either is first at the other high-wage firm with 2 applications
(with probability 1/2) and gets an oﬀer there, or she is second at the other high-wage
firm with 2 applications (with probability 1/2) and the first worker at the high-wage
firm with 2 applications is also the first worker at the high-wage firm with 3 applications
(probability 1/2). In this case worker 1 also gets matched. If worker 1 is third at the
high-wage firm with 3 applications (probability 1/3), she is first at the other high-wage
firm with 2 applications (with probability 1/2) and gets an oﬀer there, or she is second at
the other high-wage firm with 2 applications (with probability 1/2) and the first worker at
the high-wage firm with 2 applications is also the first worker at the high-wage firm with
3 applications (probability 1/2) and the first worker accepts the oﬀer at the high-wage
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firm with 3 applications with probability 1/2. So her payoﬀ is,µ
1
3
+
1
3
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
¶
+
1
3
µ
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
1
2
¶¶
w =
19
24
w
In the (0, 3, 3) case, the expected payoﬀ of worker 1 is 2/3w.
L2 A2 B2 probability L A B πWH
2 1 1 1
2
ξ2 2 2 2 3
4
w
2 2 0 1
4
ξ2 2 3 1 w
2 0 2 1
4
ξ2 2 1 3 w
1 1 2 ξ (1− ξ) 1 2 3 19
24
w
1 2 1 ξ (1− ξ) 1 3 2 19
24
w
0 2 2 (1− ξ)2 0 3 3 2
3
w
Table 14: Worker payoﬀs with two high and one low-wage firm for a worker
who sends both applications to an high wage firm
Wages The first order condition for the deviating and non deviating firms is given by
∂πFL
∂wl
= −
µ
7
4
ξ − 11
16
ξ2 − 1
16
ξ3
¶
+
¡
1− wl
¢µ7
4
− 22
16
ξ − 3
16
ξ2
¶
dξ
dwl
¯¯¯¯
wl<w
= 0
∂πFH
∂w
= −
µ
1− 1
8
ξ2
¶
− (1− w) 1
4
ξ
dξ
dw
¯¯¯¯
wl<w
= 0
If the low-wage firm oﬀers a lower wage, i.e. wl < w, the indiﬀerence condition is given
by
1
2
ξ2
µ
1
2
w +
1
2
wl
¶
+
1
4
ξ2
µ
1
3
w +
1
3
wl
¶
+
1
4
ξ2w + ξ (1− ξ)µ
5
8
w +
39
128
wl
¶
+ ξ (1− ξ)
µ
5
12
w +
119
288
wl
¶
+(1− ξ)2
µ
1
3
w +
2
3
wl
¶
=
1
2
ξ2
3
4
w +
1
2
ξ2w + ξ (1− ξ) 19
24
w + ξ (1− ξ) 19
24
w + (1− ξ)2 2
3
w
Simplifying yields
1
3
w +
3
8
wξ +
2
3
wl − 709
1152
ξwl − 1
8
wξ2 +
325
1152
ξ2wl =
2
3
w +
1
4
wξ − 1
24
wξ2
2
3
wl − 709
1152
ξwl +
325
1152
ξ2wl =
1
3
w − 1
8
wξ +
1
12
wξ2
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wl
w
=
1
3
− 1
8
ξ + 1
12
ξ2
2
3
− 709
1152
ξ + 325
1152
ξ2
The implicit function theorem implies
dξ
dwl
¯¯¯¯
wl<w
=
2
3
− 709
1152
ξ + 325
1152
ξ2¡
−1
8
+ 1
6
ξ
¢
w −
¡
− 709
1152
+ 650
1152
ξ
¢
wl
dξ
dw
¯¯¯¯
wl<w
=
−
¡
1
3
− 1
8
ξ + 1
12
ξ2
¢¡
−1
8
+ 1
6
ξ
¢
w −
¡
− 709
1152
+ 650
1152
ξ
¢
wl
Substitute this into the first order condition of firms implies for the low wage,
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and the high-wage,
−
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8
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12
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−1
8
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6
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= 0
We can use the equal profit condition to eliminate wl, i.e.,
wl = 1−
¡
1− 1
8
ξ2
¢
(1− w)¡
7
4
ξ − 11
16
ξ2 − 1
16
ξ3
¢ .
This gives for the low-wage firm,
−
µ
7
4
ξ − 11
16
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16
ξ3
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(1− 18 ξ
2)(1−w)
( 74 ξ−
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and for the high-wage firm,
−
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1− 1
8
ξ2
¶
+
(1− w) 1
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8
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12
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¡
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8
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( 74 ξ−
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w =
(− 7091152+
650
1152
ξ)(1−18 ξ
2)
( 74 ξ−
11
16
ξ2− 1
16
ξ3)
−
1
4
ξ( 13−
1
8
ξ+ 1
12
ξ2)
(1−18 ξ
2)
−
¡
− 709
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ξ
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(− 7091152+
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−
1
4
ξ( 13−
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−
¡
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+ 1
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ξ
¢
To get a value for ξ, we eliminate w from the above equations,
(− 7091152+
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10.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10
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0.1
0
xi
w
The Figure above shows that the only solution that satisfies the equal profit condition,
i.e. ξ < 0.789, is given by ξ = 0. Thus, no equilibrium wl < w exists.
B Proof of Proposition 1 (minimizing the fraction of
firms with no workers)
Let μ be the probability that a vacancy receives no applicants, if workers fully randomize,
μ =
³
1− a
v
´u
.
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In a large labor market with v, u →∞, v
u
→ θ (which we will assume from now on) this
simplifies to
μ = exp
³
−a
θ
´
.
Next, suppose that some workers do not fully randomize over all vacancies. Suppose that
qv vacancies are blue and that workers always send one of their applications to a blue
vacancy and the other ones to one of the (1 − q)v remaining vacancies. First, consider
a = 2. The total fraction of vacancies without applicants is then,
μ1q + μ2 (1− q) =
µ
q exp
µ
1
q
¶
+ (1− q) exp
µ
1
(1− q)
¶¶
exp
µ
−1
θ
¶
.
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the exponential function implies,µ
q exp
µ
1
q
¶
+ (1− q) exp
µ
1
(1− q)
¶¶
> exp (2) ,
so that the number of firms without any application is minimized at q = 1
a
= 1
2
. So for
a = 2, the number of firms without candidates is smallest if workers apply to each firm
with equal probability (i.e. when search is random and or there is no wage dispersion).
The same statement is true for any number of applications a > 2, since Jensen’s inequality
implies, Ã
aX
i=1
qi exp
µ
1
qi
¶!
> exp (a) ,
where
Xa
i=1
qi = 1.
C Simulation algorithm and decomposing a graph
into subgraphs
In our simulations, we apply the following algorithmwhere step 2 follows Corominas-Bosch
(2004) which is based on Hall’s marriage theorem.
Step 1: Take a, u, v as given and let a < v. Generate a distribution of networks for 3
cases, (i) complete randomization; workers send their first application with probability 1
v
to a particular firm and their next one with probability 1
v−1 to the remaining v− 1 firms,
... and their last one with probability 1
v−a to the remaining v − a firms, (ii) partition the
market in two groups of vacancies, A and B. Place a fraction q of the vacancies in group
A and a fraction (1− q) in group B and let each worker send one application to a vacancy
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in group A and the other (a− 1) applications to group B. Each firm in group A receives
an application from worker 1 with probability 1/qv and the same for workers 2,...u. For
the a = 3 example, each firm in group B gets with probability (a− 1) /(1−q)v the second
application of worker 1 and if it did not get the second one, it gets the third one with
probability (a− 2) / ((1− q)v − 1) etc. The same holds for the other workers. For q = 1
a
,
the arrival rate at each firm is the same and the only diﬀerence with (i) is that the market
is partitioned.
Step 2: Determine the maximum number of matches on each network. As we showed
before, ex post Bertrand competition is suﬃcient to realize this. The maximum matching
can be found using the algorithm of Corominas-Bosch (2004) which we summarize below
Step 2a: Eliminate all vacancies that did not receive any applicants.
Step 2b: For k = 2, ...v, identify the groups of k vacancies that are jointly linked
to less than k workers. Remove and collect them. We refer to those subgraphs as firm
graphs.
Step 2c: Repeat step 2 but now reverse the role of workers and firms.
Step 2d: When all those subgraphs are removed, the remaining ones are balanced
connected graphs (with an equal number of workers and firms)
Step 3: Index the firm graphs by f and the worker graphs by w and denote the total
number of firm graphs by F, the total number of worker graphs by W and the number
of even graphs by E, uf is number of workers in firm graph f , vw is number of firms in
worker graph w. f(i) is the number of firms in firm graph f , w(j) is number of workers
in worker graph w. The number of matches, M , is then given by,
M =
FX
f=1
uf +
WX
w=1
vw +
EX
e=1
ue,
the fraction of firms in firm graphs is
I/v =
FX
f=1
f(i)
and the fraction of workers in worker graphs is
J/u =
WX
w=1
w(j).
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